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Logics for the Relational Syllogistic
Ian Pratt-Hartmann Lawrence S. Moss
Abstract
The Aristotelian syllogistic cannot account for the validity of many infer-
ences involving relational facts. In this paper, we investigate the prospects
for providing a relational syllogistic. We identify several fragments based
on (a) whether negation is permitted on all nouns, including those in the
subject of a sentence; and (b) whether the subject noun phrase may con-
tain a relative clause. The logics we present are extensions of the classical
syllogistic, and we pay special attention to the question of whether re-
ductio ad absurdum is needed. Thus our main goal is to derive results on
the existence (or non-existence) of syllogistic proof systems for relational
fragments. We also determine the computational complexity of all our
fragments.
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1
1 Introduction
Augustus de Morgan famously observed that the Aristotelian syllogistic can-
not account for the validity of even the most elementary inferences involving
relational facts, for example (de Morgan [3], p. 114):
Every man is an animal
He who kills a man kills an animal.
(1)
De Morgan was certainly not the first to notice the problem of relational in-
ference: for example, it is given prominent treatment in the Port Royal Logic
(Arnauld [1], Ch. III). But whereas the Port-Royalists took such inferences to
demonstrate at most the occasional need for ingenious reformulation, de Morgan
saw in them clear evidence that binary relations must be governed by logical
principles lying outside the scope of the traditional syllogistic, and made one of
the first serious attempts to extend syllogism-like principles to relational judg-
ments (see de Morgan [4]). Ultimately, of course, de Morgan’s attempt was
to be without issue: the methods he employed were rendered obsolete at the
end of the nineteenth century by the rise of predicate logic, which provided an
expressive yet easily-understood apparatus for formalizing relational facts. (For
a modern reconstruction of de Morgan’s work, see Merrill [11].)
From a computational point of view, however, expressive power is a double-
edged sword: roughly speaking, the more expressive a language is, the harder
it is to compute with. In the last decade, this trade-off has led to renewed
interest in inexpressive logics, in which the problem of determining entailments
is algorithmically decidable with (in ideal cases) low complexity. The logical
fragments subjected to this sort of complexity-theoretic analysis have naturally
enough tended to be those which owe their salience to the syntax of first-order
logic, for example: the two-variable fragment, the guarded fragment, and various
quantifier-prefix fragments. But of course it is equally reasonable to consider
instead logics defined in terms of the syntax of natural languages. Perhaps,
therefore, it is time to return to where de Morgan and his contemporaries left
off, but with a computational agenda in mind. As we shall see, this leads to a
rather different view of the syllogistic than that defended by certain latter-day
advocates of term-logic.
This paper investigates the following six logics: (i) S, which corresponds to
the traditional syllogistic; (ii) S†, which extends S with negated nouns such as
non-man or non-animal; (iii) R, which extends S with transitive verbs such as
kills; (iv) R†, which extends S with both these constructions; (v) R∗, which
extends R by allowing subject noun phrases to contain relative clauses as in
the conclusion of Argument (1); and (vi) R∗†, which extends R∗ with negated
nouns. We derive results on the existence (or non-existence) of syllogistic proof-
systems for these logics, paying particular regard to the need for the rule of
reductio ad absurdum. Specifically, we present sound and complete syllogistic
systems for both S and S† that do not employ reductio (we call such systems
direct syllogistic systems). We then show that, by contrast, there is no sound and
complete direct syllogistic system for the fragment R; however, we do present a
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direct syllogistic system for this fragment that is sound and refutation-complete
(i.e. becomes complete if reductio ad absurdum is allowed as a single, final step).
We then consider indirect syllogistic systems—i.e. those in which the rule of
reductio ad absurdum may be employed at any point during the derivation. We
show that—unless PTime=NPTime—there is no direct syllogistic system that
is sound and refutation-complete for the fragmentR∗; however, we do provide an
indirect syllogistic system that is sound and complete for this fragment. Finally,
we show that neither R† nor R∗† has even an indirect syllogistic system that is
sound and complete. We also obtain results on the computational complexity
of determining validity in the above fragments, and show how these results
are related to the existence of sound and complete proof-systems (of various
kinds) for the fragments in question. Specifically, we show that the problem
of determining the validity of sequents in any of the fragments S, S† or R is
NLogSpace-complete; the problem of determining the validity of sequents in
the fragment R∗ is co-NPTime-complete; and the problem of determining the
validity of sequents in either of the fragments R† or R∗† is ExpTime-complete.
Thus, although we are heartened to learn of interest in relational syllogisms
going back to de Morgan, our contribution should not be read as a historical
reconstruction. It is a product of our own time, different from de Morgan’s in
both motivation and outcome.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Some syllogistic fragments
The fragments S and S† Fix a countably infinite set P. We may assume
P to contain various English common count-nouns such as man, animal etc. A
unary atom is an element of P; a unary literal is an expression of either of the
forms p or p¯, where p is a unary atom. A unary literal is called positive if it is
a unary atom; otherwise, negative. We use the (possibly decorated) variables o,
p, q to range over unary atoms, and l, m, n to range over unary literals. With
these conventions, an S-formula is an expression of any of the forms
∃(p, l), ∃(l, p), ∀(p, l), ∀(l, p¯). (2)
We provide English glosses for S-formulas as follows:
∀(p, q) Every p is a q ∀(p, q¯) No p is a q
∃(p, q) Some p is a q ∃(p, q¯) Some p is not a q.
(3)
Note that S contains the formulas ∃(p¯, q) and ∀(p¯, q¯), which are not glossed
in (3); however, the semantics given below ensure that these formulas are log-
ically equivalent to ∃(q, p¯) and ∀(q, p), respectively. We may regard S as the
language of the traditional syllogistic.
The syntax for S given above suggests a natural generalization. An S†-
formula is an expression of either of the forms
∃(l,m), ∀(l,m). (4)
3
We provide English glosses for S†-formulas in the same way as for S, except
that we sometimes require negated subjects:
∃(p¯, q¯) Some non-p is not a q ∀(p¯, q) Every non-p is a q.
We may regard S† the extension of the traditional syllogistic with noun-level
negation.
The fragments R and R† Now fix a countably infinite set R, disjoint from
P. We may assume R to contain various English transitive verbs such as kill,
admire etc. A binary atom is an element of R; a binary literal is an expression
of either of the forms r or r¯, where r is a binary atom. A binary literal is
called positive if it is a binary atom; otherwise, negative. We use the (possibly
decorated) variables r, s to range over binary atoms, and t to range over binary
literals. With these conventions, a c-term is an expression of any of the forms
l, ∃(p, t), ∀(p, t). (5)
Thus, all literals are, by definition, c-terms. We use the variables c, d to range
over c-terms. With this convention, an R-formula is an expression of any of the
forms
∃(p, c), ∃(c, p), ∀(p, c), ∀(c, p¯); (6)
Thus, all S-formulas are, by definition, R-formulas.
We gloss (non-literal) c-terms using complex noun phrases, as follows:
∃(q, r) thing which rs some q ∀(q, r) thing which rs every q (7)
∃(q, r¯) thing which does not r every q ∀(q, r¯) thing which rs no q. (8)
And we gloss R-formulas involving such c-terms accordingly, thus:
∀(p, ∃(q, r)) Every p rs some q ∀(p, ∃(q, r¯)) No p rs every q
∃(p, ∃(q, r)) Some p rs some q ∃(p, ∃(q, r¯)) Some p does not r every q
∀(p, ∀(q, r)) Every p rs every q ∀(p, ∀(q, r¯)) No p rs any q
∃(p, ∀(q, r)) Some p rs every q ∃(p, ∀(q, r¯)) Some p rs no q.
In these glosses, quantifiers in subjects are assumed to have wide scope; those
in objects, narrow scope. Also, the not in Some p does not r every q is assumed
to scope over the direct object. Again, formulas of the forms ∃(c, p) and ∀(c, p¯),
which are not glossed here, will turn out to be equivalent to formulas which are.
We may regard R as the language of the relational syllogistic.
Let us now extend R with noun-level negation just as we did with S. An
e-term is an expression of any of the forms
l, ∃(l, t), ∀(l, t). (9)
We gloss non-literal e-terms along the lines of (7) and (8), but with (possibly)
negated direct objects, for example:
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∀(q¯, r) thing which rs every non-q ∀(q¯, r¯) thing which rs no non-q.
(Another way to gloss the latter term would be thing which only rs qs.) Thus,
all c-terms are, by definition, e-terms. We use the variables e, f to range over
e-terms. With this convention, an R†-formula is an expression of any of the
forms
∃(l, e), ∃(e, l), ∀(l, e), ∀(e, l), (10)
with the obvious English glosses. Note however that noun-level negation may
be required, both in subjects and direct-objects:
∃(p¯, ∀(q¯, r)) Some non-p rs every non-q.
We may regard R† as the extension of the relational syllogistic with noun-level
negation.
The fragments R∗ and R∗† The reader may have noticed that neither R
nor R† can express the conclusion of Argument (1). We now rectify this matter
by introducing two additional fragments which can.
It will be convenient to extend the ‘bar’-notation (as in p¯ and r¯) to all e-
terms. If l = p¯ is a negative unary literal, then we take l¯ to denote p; and
similarly for binary literals. If e is an e-term of the form ∀(l, t), we denote by e¯
the corresponding e-term ∃(l, t¯); if e is an e-term of the form ∃(l, t), we denote
by e¯ the corresponding e-term ∀(l, t¯). Thus, for all e-terms e, we have e¯ = e.
Recalling that a c-term c is an expression of any of the forms l, ∃(p, t) or
∀(p, t), we call c positive if the literal l or t is positive; otherwise, negative.
Evidently, if c is a positive c-term, then c¯ is a negative c-term, and vice-versa.
We now define an R∗-formula to be an expression of any of the forms
∃(c+, d), ∃(d, c+), ∀(c+, d), ∀(d, c+), (11)
where c+ ranges over positive c-terms and d over all c-terms (positive or neg-
ative). These forms may then be glossed by combining the glosses (3) and (7)
in the obvious way. Thus, for example, the conclusion of Argument (1) may be
formalized in R∗ as
∀(∃(man, kill), ∃(animal, kill))
Everything which kills a man (is a thing which) kills an animal.
It is straightforward to check that, in providing English glosses for R∗-formulas,
noun-level negation (i.e. expressions such as non-man) is not required. The study
of R∗ is motivated in part by its close connection to the system described in
McAllester and Givan [10], and in part by the fact that, from both a proof-
theoretic and complexity-theoretic point of view, it occupies an intermediate
position, in a sense that will be made precise below.
We come finally to the most general of the fragments studied here. Recalling
that the variables e and f range over e-terms, an R∗†-formula is an expression
of either of the forms
∃(e, f), ∀(e, f). (12)
These formulas receive the obvious glosses, for example:
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SR
R∗
S†
R†
R∗†
⊆
⊆
⊆
⊇
⊇ ⊇
⊇
S syllogistic
S
† syllogistic with noun-negation
R relational syllogistic
R
† relational syllogistic with noun-negation
R
∗ relational syllogistic with complex subjects
R
∗† relational syllogistic with complex subjects
and noun-negation
Figure 1: The six syllogistic fragments: S, S†, R, R†, R∗ and R∗†.
Expression Variables Syntax
unary atom o, p, q
binary atom r, s
unary literal l, m, n p | p¯
binary literal t r | r¯
positive c-term b+, c+ p | ∃(p, r) | ∀(p, r)
c-term c, d l | ∃(p, t) | ∀(p, t)
e-term e, f l | ∃(l, t) | ∀(l, t)
S-formula ∃(p, l) | ∃(l, p) | ∀(p, l) | ∀(l, p¯)
S†-formula ∃(l,m) | ∀(l,m)
R-formula ∃(p, c) | ∃(c, p) | ∀(p, c) | ∀(c, p¯)
R†-formula ∃(l, e) | ∃(e, l) | ∀(l, e) | ∀(e, l)
R∗-formula ∃(c+, d) | ∃(d, c+) | ∀(c+, d) | ∀(d, c+)
R∗†-formula ∃(e, f) | ∀(e, f)
Figure 2: Syntax of syllogistic fragments: quick reference guide.
∀(∃(animal, kill), ∃(man, kill))
Everything which kills a non-animal (is a thing which) kills a non-man.
We may regard R∗† as the result of extending R∗ with noun-level negation.
We denote the set of S-formulas simply by S, and similarly for S†, R, R†,R∗
and R∗†. Many of the results established below apply to all of these fragments.
Accordingly, we say that a syllogistic fragment is any of the fragments S, S†, R,
R†, R∗ orR∗†, and we use the variable F to range over the syllogistic fragments.
Fig. 1 gives an overview of the syllogistic fragments, and Fig. 2 a quick reference
guide to their syntax.
It will be convenient to extend the bar-notation to formulas. If ϕ is an R∗†-
formula of the form ∀(e, f), we denote by ϕ¯ the R∗†-formula ∃(e, f¯); if ϕ is an
R∗†-formula of the form ∃(e, f), we denote by ϕ¯ the R∗†-formula ∀(e, f¯). It is
easy to verify that, ϕ¯ = ϕ, and that, for any syllogistic fragment F , ϕ ∈ F
implies ϕ¯ ∈ F .
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Semantics We now provide semantics for the fragmentR∗† (and hence for any
syllogistic fragment). A structure A is a triple 〈A, {pA}p∈P, {rA}r∈R〉, where A
is a non-empty set, pA ⊆ A, for every p ∈ P, and rA ⊆ A2, for every r ∈ R.
The set A is called the domain of A. Given a structure A, we extend the maps
p 7→ pA and r 7→ rA to all e-terms by setting
p¯A = A \ pA
r¯A = A2 \ rA
∃(l, t)A = {a ∈ A | 〈a, b〉 ∈ tA for some b ∈ lA}
∀(l, t)A = {a ∈ A | 〈a, b〉 ∈ tA for all b ∈ lA}.
We define the truth-relation |= between structures and R∗†-formulas by declar-
ing A |= ∀(e, f) if and only if eA ⊆ fA, and A |= ∃(e, f) if and only if eA∩fA 6= ∅.
If Θ is a set of formulas, we write A |= Θ if, for all θ ∈ Θ, A |= θ. Of course,
this defines the truth-relation for formulas of any syllogistic fragment F .
A formula θ is satisfiable if there exists A such that A |= θ; a set of formulas
Θ is satisfiable if there exists A such that A |= Θ. If, for all structures A,
A |= Θ implies A |= θ, we write Θ |= θ. We take it as uncontroversial that
Θ |= θ constitutes a rational reconstruction of the pre-theoretic judgment that
a conclusion θ may be validly inferred from premises Θ. For example, the valid
argument
Some artist is a beekeeper
Every artist is a carpenter
No beekeeper is a dentist
Some carpenter is not a dentist
corresponds to the valid sequent of S-formulas:
{∃(artist, beekeeper), ∀(artist, carpenter),
∀(beekeeper, dentist)} |= ∃(carpenter, dentist). (13)
Likewise, the valid argument
Some artist hates some artist
No beekeeper hates any beekeeper
Some artist is not a beekeeper
corresponds to the valid sequent of R-formulas:
{∃(artist, ∃(artist, hate)),
∀(beekeeper, ∀(beekeeper, hate))} |= ∃(artist, beekeeper). (14)
We follow modern practice in taking universal quantification not to carry exis-
tential commitment: thus {∀(p, q)} 6|= ∃(p, q).
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Absurdity, negation and identifications A simple check shows that, for
any structure A and any e-term e, e¯A = A \ eA; hence, A 6|= ∃(e, e¯). We refer to
a formula of this form as an absurdity. Even the smallest syllogistic fragment,
S, contains absurdities, namely, those of the form ∃(p, p¯). Where the fragment
F is clear from context, we write ⊥ indifferently to denote any absurdity in F .
For any structure A and any R∗†-formula ϕ, A |= ϕ if and only if A 6|= ϕ¯.
Also, ϕ and ϕ¯ belong to the same syllogistic fragments. Thus, if F is a syllogistic
fragment and ϕ an F -formula, we may regard ϕ¯ as the negation of ϕ.
For any structure A and any e-terms e and f , A |= ∃(e, f) if and only if
A |= ∃(f, e). Also, these formulas belong to the same syllogistic fragments. In
the sequel, therefore, we identify such pairs of formulas, silently transforming one
to the other as necessary. Similarly, for the pair of formulas ∀(e, f) and ∀(f¯ , e¯).
These identifications make no essential difference to the results derived below
on syllogistic proof-systems; however, they greatly simplify their presentation
and analysis.
2.2 Syllogistic rules and reductio ad absurdum
Let F be a syllogistic fragment. A derivation relation |∼ in F is a subset of
P(F) × F , where P(F) is the power set of F . For readability, we write Θ |∼ θ
instead of 〈Θ, θ〉 ∈ |∼. We say that |∼ is sound if Θ |∼ θ implies Θ |= θ, and
complete (for F) if Θ |= θ implies Θ |∼ θ. A set Θ of F -formulas is inconsistent
(with respect to |∼) if Θ |∼ ⊥ for some absurdity ⊥ ∈ F ; otherwise, consistent. A
weakening of completeness called refutation-completeness will prove important
in the sequel: |∼ is refutation-complete if all unsatisfiable sets Θ are inconsistent.
Completeness trivially implies refutation-completeness, but not conversely. We
are primarily interested in derivation relations induced by two different sorts
of deductive system: direct syllogistic systems and indirect syllogistic systems.
These we now proceed to define.
Direct syllogistic systems Let F be a syllogistic fragment. We employ the
following terminology. A syllogistic rule (sometimes, simply: rule) in F is a pair
Θ/θ, where Θ is a finite set (possibly empty) of F -formulas, and θ an F -formula.
We call Θ the antecedents of the rule, and θ its consequent. The rule Θ/θ is
sound if Θ |= θ. We generally display rules in ‘natural-deduction’ style. For
example,
∀(q, o) ∃(p, q)
∃(p, o)
∀(q, o¯) ∃(p, q)
∃(p, o¯)
(15)
where p, q and o are unary atoms, are syllogistic rules in S, corresponding to the
traditional syllogisms Darii and Ferio, respectively. A substitution is a function
g = g1 ∪ g2, where g1 : P → P and g2 : R → R. If θ is an F -formula, denote
by g(θ) the F -formula which results by replacing any atom (unary or binary)
in θ by its image under g, and similarly for sets of formulas. An instance of a
syllogistic rule Θ/θ is the syllogistic rule g(Θ)/g(θ), where g is a substitution.
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Syllogistic rules which differ only with respect to re-naming of unary or
binary atoms will be informally regarded as identical, because they have the
same instances. Thus, the letters p, q and o in (15) function, in effect, as
variables ranging over unary atoms. It is often convenient to display syllogistic
rules using variables ranging over other types of expressions, understanding that
these are just more compact ways of writing finite collections of syllogistic rules
in the official sense. For example, the two rules (15) may be more compactly
written
∀(q, l) ∃(p, q)
∃(p, l)
(D1)
where p and q range over unary atoms, but l ranges over unary literals.
Fix a syllogistic fragment F , and let X be a set of syllogistic rules in F .
Define ⊢X to be the smallest derivation relation in F satisfying:
1. if θ ∈ Θ, then Θ ⊢X θ;
2. if {θ1, . . . , θn}/θ is a rule in X, g a substitution, Θ = Θ1 ∪ · · · ∪ Θn, and
Θi ⊢X g(θi) for all i (1 6 i 6 n), then Θ ⊢X g(θ).
It is simple to show that the derivation relation ⊢X is sound if and only if each
rule in X is sound.
Informally, we imagine chaining together instances of the rules in X to con-
struct derivations, in the obvious way; and we refer to the resulting proof system
as the direct syllogistic system defined by X. We generally display derivations in
natural-deduction style. Thus, for example, if X is any rule set containing (D1),
the derivation
∀(beekeeper, dentist)
∀(artist, carpenter) ∃(artist, beekeeper)
∃(carpenter, beekeeper)
(D1)
∃(carpenter, dentist)
(D1)
establishes that
{∃(artist, beekeeper), ∀(artist, carpenter),
∀(beekeeper, dentist)} ⊢X ∃(carpenter, dentist),
which, given the soundness of (D1), entails the validity (13). Notice, inciden-
tally, that the first application of (D1) in the above derivation depends on the
silent identification of ∃(p, q) and ∃(q, p). In the sequel, we reason freely about
derivations in order to establish properties of derivation relations.
Derivation relations defined by direct proof-systems are easily seen to have
polynomial-time complexity.
Lemma 2.1. Let F be a syllogistic fragment, and X a finite set of syllogistic
rules in F . The problem of determining whether Θ ⊢X θ, for a given set of
F-formulas Θ and F-formula θ, is in PTime.
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Proof. Let Σ be the set of all atoms (unary or binary) occurring in Θ ∪ {θ},
together with one additional binary atom r. We first observe that, if there is a
derivation of θ from Θ using the rules X, then there is such a derivation involving
only the atoms occurring in Σ. For, given any derivation of θ from Θ, uniformly
replace any unary atom that does not occur in Θ ∪ {θ} with one that does.
Similarly, uniformly replace any binary atom which does not occur in Θ ∪ {θ}
with one which does (or with r in case Θ∪{θ} contains no binary atoms). This
process obviously leaves us with a derivation of θ from Θ, using the rules X.
To prove the lemma, let the the total number of symbols occurring in Θ ∪
{θ} be n. Certainly, |Σ| 6 n. Let X comprise k1 proof-rules, each of which
contains at most k2 atoms (unary or binary). The number of rule instances
involving only atoms in Σ is bounded by p(n) = k1n
k2 . Hence, we need never
consider derivations with ‘depth’ greater than p(n). Let Θi be the set of formulas
involving only the atoms in Σ, and derivable from Θ using a derivation of depth
i or less (0 6 i 6 p(n)). Evidently, |Θi| 6 |Θ|+ p(n). It is then straightforward
to compute the successive Θi in total time bounded by a polynomial function
of n.
Indirect syllogistic systems In addition to syllogistic rules, we consider the
traditional rule of reductio ad absurdum (RAA), which allows us to derive a
proposition ϕ (in some syllogistic fragment) by first assuming ϕ¯ and deriving
an absurdity. Again, we display this rule, in natural-deduction-style, as
· · · [ϕ¯]i · · · [ϕ¯]i · · ·
....
⊥
ϕ (RAA)
i
.
The interpretation is as follows: if an absurdity has been derived from the set
of premises Φ together with the premise ϕ¯, then ϕ may be derived from the
premises Φ alone. The premise ϕ¯ may be used several times (including zero) in
the derivation of the absurdity; moreover, Φ is allowed to contain ϕ¯. We say that
the (zero or more) bracketed instances of the premise ϕ¯ have been discharged
by application of (RAA). The numerical superscript i simply allows us to keep
track of which application of (RAA) was responsible for the discharge of which
(instances of a) premise.
Fix a syllogistic fragment F , and let X be a set of syllogistic rules in F .
Define X to be the smallest derivation relation in F satisfying:
1. if θ ∈ Θ, then Θ X θ;
2. if {θ1, . . . , θn}/θ is a rule in X, g a substitution, Θ = Θ1 ∪ · · · ∪ Θn, and
Θi X g(θi) for all i (1 6 i 6 n), then Θ X g(θ);
3. if Θ ∪ {θ¯} X ⊥, then Θ X θ.
It is again simple to show that X is sound if and only if each rule in X is sound.
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Informally, we imagine chaining together instances of the rules in X and the
rule (RAA) to form indirect derivations in the obvious way; and we refer to
the resulting proof system as the indirect syllogistic system defined by X. We
generally display indirect derivations in natural-deduction style, as the following
example illustrates. First, consider the (evidently sound) syllogistic rules:
∀(q, c¯) ∃(p, c)
∃(p, q¯)
(D3)
∀(p, ∀(o, t)) ∃(q, o)
∀(p, ∃(q, t))
(∀∀).
Here, as usual, o, p and q range over unary atoms, t over binary literals and c
over c-terms. In addition, we generalize the rule (D1) given above so that the
variable l (ranging over literals) may be replaced by the variable c (ranging over
c-terms). Then we have the following indirect derivation.
∀(bkpr,∃(bkpr, hate))
∀(art,∀(art,hate)) [∃(art,bkpr)]1
∀(art,∃(bkpr,hate))
(∀∀)
[∃(art,bkpr)]1
∃(bkpr,∃(bkpr,hate))
(D1)
∃(bkpr,bkpr)
(D3)
∀(art,bkpr)
(RAA)1.
Here, two instances of the premise ∃(artist, beekeeper) have been discharged by
the final application of (RAA). This derivation establishes that, if X is any set
of rules containing (D3), (∀∀) and (D1) (generalized as indicated), then
{∀(artist, ∀(artist, hate)),
∀(beekeeper, ∃(beekeeper, hate))} X ∀(artist, beekeeper).
Bearing in mind that ∃(beekeeper, hate) = ∀(beekeeper, hate), and given the
soundness of the syllogistic rules employed, this entails the validity (14).
It is important to realize that (RAA) is not itself a syllogistic rule. In
particular, an application of (RAA) in general decreases the set of premises of
the derivations in which it features. As we shall see below, the special status
of (RAA) is essential: indirect syllogistic systems are in general more powerful
than direct syllogistic systems.
If ⊢X is refutation-complete, then X is complete. For suppose Θ |= θ.
Then Θ ∪ {θ¯} is unsatisfiable; hence, by the refutation-completeness of ⊢X,
Θ ∪ {θ¯} ⊢X ⊥; hence, using a single, final application of (RAA), Θ X θ. We
stress, however, that (RAA) is not in general restricted to the final step in an
X-derivation; rather, it may be employed at any point, and any number of
times. In particular, the reasoning of Lemma 2.1 fails: in Section 5 we present
a set of syllogistic rules R∗ such that R∗ is co-NPTime-hard.
We conclude this discussion by showing that indirect proof-systems yield a
version of Lindenbaum’s Lemma. Let F be any syllogistic fragment. We say
that a set of F -formulas Θ is F -complete if, for every F -formula θ, either θ ∈ Θ
or θ¯ ∈ Θ. If the fragment F is clear from context, we say complete instead of F -
complete; notice however that F -completeness of a set of formulas has nothing
to do with the completeness of a derivation relation.
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Lemma 2.2. Let F be a syllogistic fragment, Θ a set of F-formulas and X a
set of syllogistic rules in F . If Θ is consistent with respect to X, then there
exists a complete set of F-formulas ∆ ⊇ Θ consistent with respect to X.
Proof. Let (ϕn)n∈N enumerate the formulas of F . We define a sequence of
consistent sets ∆n as follows. Let ∆0 = Θ. For n > 0, let
∆n+1 =
{
∆n ∪ {ϕn} if ∆n ∪ {ϕn} is consistent
∆n ∪ {ϕ¯n} otherwise.
and let ∆ =
⋃
n∆n. We show by induction that each ∆n is consistent. For
suppose ∆n is consistent, but ∆n+1 inconsistent. Then ∆n ∪ {ϕn} X ⊥, so
that ∆n X ϕ¯n using (RAA). In addition, ∆n ∪ {ϕ¯n} X ⊥′ (where ⊥′ is some
absurdity). We take a derivation establishing the latter assertion and replace
each (undischarged) premise ϕ¯ with a derivation of ϕ¯ from ∆n. This shows ∆n
to be inconsistent, a contradiction. Thus, ∆n is consistent, for all n.
Since derivations are finite, ∆ is consistent. Obviously, ∆ is F -complete.
3 S and S†: direct systems
In the previous section, we defined our general notions, including the fragments
S and S†. These are the simplest in our paper, coming without verbs. This
section provides sound and complete syllogistic logics for them. Let S be the
following set of rules, where p and q range over unary atoms, l over unary literals,
and and ϕ, ψ over S-formulas.
∀(q, l) ∃(p, q)
∃(p, l)
(D1)
∀(p, q) ∀(q, l)
∀(p, l)
(B)
∀(p, p¯)
∀(p, l)
(A)
∃(p, l) ∀(p, q)
∃(q, l)
(D2) ψ ψ¯
ϕ (X)
∀(q, l¯) ∃(p, l)
∃(p, q¯)
(D3)
∀(p, p)
(T)
∃(p, l)
∃(p, p)
(I)
Rules (D1) and (D3) we have met already (the latter in a rather more general
form); Rules (D2) and (B) are new, but evidently versions of classical syllo-
gisms. Rule (X) is the classical rule of ex falso quodlibet : from a contradiction,
the reasoner may have anything he pleases [quodlibet]. This rule is not to be
confused with (RAA): (X) is a syllogistic rule, in the technical sense of this pa-
per; (RAA) is not. Rules (A), (T) and (I) have no classical counterparts. Rule
(A) stems from the fact that if all p are non-p, then there are no p whatsoever;
vacuously, then, all p are l. To see that (T) is needed, note that without it
there would be no way to derive ∀(p, p) from the empty set of premises. Rule
(I) is self-explanatory. We remark that Rule (D1) is actually redundant in this
context. For consider any instance {∀(q′, l′), ∃(p′, q′)}/∃(p′, l′) of (D1). If l′ = o
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is a positive literal, then, using the identification ∃(e, f) = ∃(f, e), we may re-
write this instance as {∀(q′, o), ∃(q′, p′)}/∃(o, p′), which is an instance of (D2).
On the other hand, if l′ = o¯, then, using the identification ∀(e, f) = ∀(f¯ , e¯), we
may re-write the instance as {∀(o, q¯′), ∃(p′, q′)}/∃(p′, o¯), which is an instance of
(D3). We retain Rule (D1) for ease of use, and to make the relationship to the
system R introduced in Section 4.2 more transparent.
Turning now to the fragment S†, let S† comprise the following syllogistic
rules, where l, m and n range over unary literals, and ϕ, ψ over S†-formulas.
∃(l, n) ∀(l,m)
∃(m,n)
(D)
∀(l,m) ∀(m,n)
∀(l, n)
(B)
∀(l, l¯)
∀(l,m)
(A)
∀(l, l)
(T)
∃(l,m)
∃(l, l)
(I) ψ ψ¯
ϕ (X)
∀(l¯, l)
∃(l, l)
(N)
The rules in S† are the natural generalizations of those in S to reflect the more
liberal syntax of S†, but with two small changes: first, rules (D1)–(D3) have
merged into a single rule (D); second, an extra rule (N) has been added. The
soundness of (N) is due to the requirement that our structures have non-empty
domains.
That S† really is an extension of S is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Any instance of a rule in S† which involves only formulas in the
fragment S is an instance of a rule of S, and conversely.
Proof. We prove the first statement by considering the rules of S† one at a time.
We illustrate here with Rule (D). Suppose that all formulas in some instance
{∃(l, n), ∀(l,m)}/∃(m,n) of this rule are in S. If m is positive, then so is l
(since ∀(l,m) ∈ S). In this case, our instance matches Rule (D2) in the system
S. On the other hand, if m is negative, then n is positive (since ∃(m,n) ∈
S). We then use the identifications ∀(l,m) = ∀(m¯, l¯), ∃(l, n) = ∃(n, l), and
∃(m,n) = ∃(n,m), and re-write the rule-instance as {∃(n, l), ∀(m¯, l¯)}/∃(n,m),
which (bearing in mind that n and m¯ are unary atoms) matches Rule (D3) in
the system S. The other rules are dealt with similarly. Note in particular that
all instances of Rule (N) involve a formula lying outside the fragment S, so that
the statement holds trivially for this rule. The second statement of the lemma
is completely routine.
In view of Lemma 3.1, we have taken the liberty of using the same names—(B),
(A), (T), (I) and (X)—for corresponding rules in S and S†.
It is obvious that ⊢S and ⊢S† are sound. We now prove their completeness
(for the fragments for S and S†, respectively). It is convenient to prove the
completeness of ⊢S† , and then to derive the result for ⊢S as a special case.
Starting on the proof In the remainder of this section, then, a formula
is an S†-formula unless otherwise stated. A universal formula is one of the
form ∀(l,m); an existential formula is one of the form ∃(l,m). If A and B are
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structures with disjoint domains A and B, respectively, denote by A ∪ B the
structure with domain A∪B and interpretations pA∪B = pA∪pB for any unary
atom p. (Note that S† features only unary atoms.)
Lemma 3.2. Suppose Φ ∪Ψ |= θ, where Φ is a set of universal formulas, Ψ a
set of existential formulas, and θ a formula.
1. If Φ ∪Ψ is satisfiable and θ is universal, then Φ |= θ.
2. If Ψ 6= ∅ and θ is existential, then there exists ψ ∈ Ψ such that Φ∪{ψ} |= θ.
3. If Ψ = ∅ and θ = ∃(l,m) is existential, then Φ |= ∀(l¯, l) and Φ |= ∀(m¯,m).
Proof. In each case, assume the contrary.
1. There exist structures A |= Φ ∪ Ψ and B |= Φ ∪ θ¯. We may assume that
A ∩B = ∅. But then A ∪B |= Φ ∪Ψ ∪ {θ¯}, a contradiction.
2. For every ψ ∈ Ψ, there exists a structure Aψ such that Aψ |= Φ ∪
{ψ, θ¯}. Again, we assume that the domains are pairwise disjoint. But
then
⋃
ψ∈ΨAψ |= Φ ∪Ψ ∪ {θ¯}, a contradiction.
3. If Φ 6|= ∀(l¯, l), there exists a structure A such that A |= Φ ∪ {∃(l¯, l¯)}.
Choose a ∈ l¯A, and let B be the structure obtained by restricting A to
the singleton domain {a}. Then B |= Φ ∪ {θ¯}, a contradiction. A similar
argument applies if Φ 6|= ∀(m¯,m).
We write Φ ⊢BTA ϕ if there is a derivation in ⊢S† of ϕ from Φ employing only
the rules (B), (T) and (A). We call a set V of literals consistent if l ∈ V implies
l¯ 6∈ V (otherwise inconsistent); we call V complete if l 6∈ V implies l¯ ∈ V . Let
Φ be a set of universal formulas and V a set of literals. Define SΦ to be the set
of literals:
{m : Φ ⊢BTA ∀(l,m) for some l ∈ V }.
We say that V is Φ-closed if V Φ ⊆ V .
Lemma 3.3. Let Φ be a set of universal formulas and V a set of literals. Then
V Φ is Φ-closed, and V ⊆ V Φ.
Proof. Almost immediate, by rules (B) and (T).
Evidently, the union of any collection of Φ-closed sets of literals is Φ-closed.
Lemma 3.4. Let Φ be a set of universal formulas and V a set of literals. If
V Φ is inconsistent, then there exist literals l, l′ ∈ V such that Φ ⊢BTA ∀(l, l¯′).
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Proof. If m, m¯ ∈ V Φ, pick l, l′ ∈ V with Φ ⊢BTA ∀(l,m) and Φ ⊢BTA ∀(l′, m¯).
Re-writing ∀(l′, m¯) as ∀(m, l¯′), we have a derivation from Φ
....
∀(l,m)
....
∀(m, l¯′)
∀(l, l¯′)
(B),
as claimed.
Lemma 3.5. Let Φ be a set of universal formulas. Any non-empty, Φ-closed,
consistent set of literals has a Φ-closed, consistent, complete extension.
Proof. Let V0 be a non-empty, Φ-closed, consistent set of literals. Enumerate
the set of all literals as l1, l2, . . .. For all i > 0, define
Vi+1 =
{
Vi if li+1 ∈ Vi(
Vi ∪ {l¯i+1}
)Φ
otherwise.
and define V =
⋃
i Vi. Thus, V is Φ-closed, complete and includes V0. We
remark that, since V0 ⊆ Vi, Vi is non-empty for all i > 0. To show that V is
consistent, suppose otherwise. Let i be the least natural number such that Vi+1
is inconsistent. Hence, Vi+1 =
(
Vi ∪ {l¯i+1}
)Φ
, and so by Lemma 3.4 there exist
literals l, l′ ∈ Vi ∪ {l¯i+1} such that Φ ⊢BTA ∀(l, l¯′). Since Vi is Φ-closed and
consistent, l and l′ cannot both be in Vi, and so we may assume without loss
of generality that l′ = l¯i+1, whence Φ ⊢BTA ∀(l, li+1). Now, either l ∈ Vi or
l = l¯i+1. In the former case, we have li+1 ∈ Vi, because Vi is Φ-closed; in the
latter, let l′′ be any literal in Vi (which we know to be non-empty). Then the
inference
∀(l¯i+1, li+1)
∀(l′′, li+1)
(A)
guarantees that, again, li+1 ∈ Vi. Either way, Vi+1 = Vi, a contradiction.
Theorem 3.6. The derivation relation ⊢S† is sound and complete for S
†.
Proof. Soundness is routine. For the converse, let Θ be a set of S†-formulas and
θ a S†-formula, and suppose Θ |= θ. By the compactness theorem for first-order
logic, we may safely assume that Θ is finite. Suppose for the moment that Θ is
satisfiable, and write Θ = Φ ∪Ψ, where Φ is a set of universal formulas and Ψ
a set of existential formulas. We consider three cases: (1) θ is universal; (2) θ
is existential and Ψ is non-empty; and (3) θ is existential and Ψ is empty.
In the remainder of this proof, we simplify our notation to write ⊢ for ⊢S† .
Case (1): Write θ = ∀(l0,m0). By Lemma 3.2, Part 1, Φ |= θ. Let
V0 = {l0, m¯0}
Φ. (16)
Then V0 is non-empty and Φ-closed, by Lemma 3.3. We claim that V0 is incon-
sistent. For suppose otherwise. By Lemma 3.5, let V be a consistent complete
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extension of V0, and define A to be the structure with singleton domain {a}
given by
pA =
{
{a} if p ∈ V
∅ otherwise,
for every atom p. It is easily seen that A |= Φ ∪ θ¯, a contradiction. So by
Lemma 3.4, there exist literals l, l′ ∈ {l0, m¯0} such that
Φ ⊢BTA ∀(l, l¯
′). (17)
By exchanging l and l′ if necessary, we have two sub-cases: (i) l = l0 and
l′ = m¯0; (ii) l = l
′ ∈ {l0, m¯0}. In sub-case (i), (17) simply asserts that Φ ⊢ θ.
In sub-case (ii), we have one of the derivations from Φ
....
∀(l0, l¯0)
∀(m¯0, l¯0)
(A)
....
∀(m¯0,m0)
∀(l0,m0)
(A),
and so Φ ⊢ θ.
Case (2): Write θ = ∃(l,m). By Lemma 3.2, Part 2, there exists ψ = ∃(l0,m0) ∈
Ψ such that Φ ∪ {ψ} |= θ. Set
V0 = {l0,m0, l¯}
Φ.
The set V0 must be inconsistent. For otherwise, we can easily construct, using
a parallel argument to that employed in Case (1), a structure A such that
A |= Φ ∪ {ψ, θ¯}, contradicting the fact that Φ ∪ {ψ} |= θ. Hence, there exist
literals l1, l2 ∈ {l0,m0, l¯} such that Φ ⊢BTA ∀(l1, l¯2). If l1 and l2 are both in
{l0,m0}, then Θ is unsatisfiable, contrary to hypothesis. So assume, without
loss of generality, that l2 = l¯. Thus, Φ ⊢BTA ∀(l1, l), and we have the following
possibilities: (i) l1 = l0; (ii) l1 = m0; (iii) l1 = l¯. Possibility (i) yields Φ ⊢ ∀(l0, l).
Possibility (ii) yields Φ ⊢ ∀(m0, l). Possibility (iii) also yields Φ ⊢ ∀(l0, l), via
the derivation ....
∀(l¯, l)
∀(l0, l)
(A).
In other words, we have proved:
either Φ ⊢ ∀(l0, l) or Φ ⊢ ∀(m0, l). (18)
Replacing l by m in the above argument yields, in exactly the same way:
either Φ ⊢ ∀(l0,m) or Φ ⊢ ∀(m0,m). (19)
Considering (18), we may assume, by transposing l0 and m0 if necessary, that
Φ ⊢ ∀(l0, l). This leaves us with the two possibilities in (19). If Φ ⊢ ∀(m0,m),
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we have
∃(l0,m0)
....
∀(l0, l)
∃(l,m0)
(D)
....
∀(m0,m)
∃(l,m)
(D);
if, on the other hand, Φ ⊢ ∀(l0,m), we have
∃(l0,m0)
∃(l0, l0)
(I)
....
∀(l0, l)
∃(l, l0)
(D)
....
∀(l0,m)
∃(l,m)
(D).
(20)
Either way, Θ ⊢ θ, as required.
Case (3): Write θ = ∃(l,m). Since Θ = Φ |= θ, by Lemma 3.2, Part 3, Φ |= ∀(l¯, l)
and Φ |= ∀(m¯,m). By Case (1), Φ ⊢ ∀(l¯, l) and Φ ⊢ ∀(m¯,m). Therefore, we
have the derivation from Φ
....
∀(l¯, l)
∃(l, l)
(N)
....
∀(m¯,m)
∀(l,m)
(A)
∃(l,m)
(D),
and Θ ⊢ θ.
We have now shown that, for Θ satisfiable, Θ |= θ implies Θ ⊢ θ. It remains
only to consider the case where Θ is unsatisfiable. If so, let Θ′ ∪ {θ′} be a
minimal unsatisfiable subset of Θ. (Remember, we are allowed to assume that
Θ is finite.) Hence, Θ′ is satisfiable, with Θ′ |= θ¯′. By the previous argument,
Θ′ ⊢ θ¯′. Thus, we have the derivation from Θ′ ∪ {θ′}
....
θ¯′ θ′
θ
(X),
and Θ ⊢ θ.
Theorem 3.7. The derivation relation ⊢S is sound and complete for S.
Proof. Soundness is obvious. Suppose that Θ is a satisfiable set of S-formulas
and θ an S-formula such that Θ |= θ. By Theorem 3.6, Θ ⊢S† θ. We must show
that Θ ⊢S θ. Since derivations (in ⊢S†) are finite, we may assume without loss
of generality that Θ is finite. For the moment, let us further assume that Θ is
satisfiable.
Let p, q be any unary atoms. We claim that Θ 6|= ∀(p¯, q). For otherwise, by
Lemma 3.2 Part 1, there exists a subset Φ ⊆ Θ of universal formulas such that
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Φ |= ∀(p¯, q). Now let A be any structure such that oA = ∅ for every unary atom
o. Since Φ ⊆ S, A |= Φ; but A 6|= ∀(p¯, q), a contradiction. Furthermore, since
⊢S† is sound, it follows of course that Θ 6⊢S† ∀(p¯, q).
Consider any derivation in ⊢S† with premises Θ. We claim that, if this
derivation contains any formula of the form ∃(p¯, q¯), then the final conclusion of
this derivation is also of that form. For, since Θ is, by assumption, satisfiable,
(X) cannot be used in the derivation; and the only other rules in S† with any
premise of the form ∃(p¯, q¯) are (I) and (D), thus:
∃(p¯, q¯)
∃(p¯, p¯)
(I)
∃(p¯, q¯) ∀(p¯, l)
∃(q¯, l)
(D).
By the observation of the previous paragraph, the literal l in this instance of
(D) must be negative. In either case, the consequent of the rule is of the form
∃(p¯, q¯), as claimed.
Now take any derivation of θ from Θ in ⊢S† . (We know that one exists.)
Since θ ∈ S is definitely not of the form ∃(p¯, q¯), it follows from the previous
two paragraphs that this derivation cannot involve any formula of either of the
forms ∀(p¯, q) or ∃(p¯, q¯). That is, all the formulas are in S. By Lemma 3.1,
Θ ⊢S θ.
This proves the theorem in the case where the (finite) set of S-formulas Θ is
satisfiable. If Θ is unsatisfiable, let Θ′ ∪ {θ′} be a minimal unsatisfiable subset
of Θ. Hence, Θ′ is satisfiable, with Θ′ |= θ¯′. By the result just established,
Θ′ ⊢S θ¯′. By a single application of (X), Θ ⊢S θ.
4 R: a refutation complete system
We turn from S to R. We exhibit a set R of syllogistic rules in R, and prove
that ⊢R is a sound and refutation-complete derivation relation for R; we also
prove that there is no finite set of rules X in R such that X is sound and complete
for R. This highlights the importance of (RAA) in obtaining complete logics.
Our refutation-completeness proof also implies that the problem of determining
whether a given R-sequent is valid is in NLogSpace, a fact which is otherwise
not obvious.
4.1 There are no sound and complete syllogistic systems
for R
Theorem 4.1. There exists no finite set X of syllogistic rules in R such that
⊢X is both sound and complete.
Proof. Let X be any finite set of syllogistic rules for R, and suppose ⊢X is sound.
We show that it is not complete. Since X is finite, fix n ∈ N greater than the
number of antecedents in any rule in X.
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Let p1, . . . , pn be distinct unary atoms and r a binary atom. Let Γ be the
following set of R-formulas:
∀(pi, ∃(pi+1, r)) (1 6 i < n) (21)
∀(p1, ∀(pn, r)) (22)
∀(p, p) (p ∈ P) (23)
∀(pi, p¯j) (1 6 i < j 6 n) (24)
and let γ be the R-formula ∀(p1, ∃(pn, r)). Observe that Γ |= γ. To see this, let
A |= Γ. If pA1 = ∅, then trivially A |= γ; on the other hand, if p
A
1 6= ∅, a simple
induction using formulas (21) shows that pAi 6= ∅ for all i (1 6 i 6 n), whence
A |= γ by (22).
For 1 6 i < n, let ∆i = Γ \ {∀(pi, ∃(pi+1, r))}.
Claim 4.2. If ϕ ∈ R and ∆i |= ϕ, then ϕ ∈ Γ.
It follows from this claim that Γ 6⊢X γ. For, since no rule of X has more
than n− 1 antecedents, any instance of those antecedents contained in Γ must
be contained in ∆i for some i. Let δ be the corresponding instance of the
consequent of that rule. Since ⊢X is sound, ∆i |= δ. By Claim 4.2, δ ∈ Γ. By
induction on the number of steps in derivations, we see that no derivation from
Γ leads to a formula not in Γ. But γ 6∈ Γ.
Proof of Claim. Certainly, ∆i has a model, for instance the model Ai given by:
p1
GF ED

// p2 // · · · // pi pi+1 // · · · // pn
(25)
Here, A = {p1, . . . , pn}, p
Ai
j = {pj} for all j (1 6 j 6 n), and r
Ai is indicated
by the arrows. All other atoms (unary or binary) are assumed to have empty
extensions. Note that there is no arrow from pi to pi+1.
We consider the various possibilities for ϕ in turn and check that either
ϕ ∈ Γ or there is a model of ∆i in which ϕ is false.
(i) ϕ is of the form ∀(p, p). Then ϕ ∈ Γ by (23).
(ii) ϕ is not of the form ∀(p, p), and involves at least one unary or binary atom
other than p1, . . . , pn, r. In this case, it is straightforward to modify Ai so as to
obtain a model A′i of ∆i such that A
′
i 6|= ϕ. Henceforth, then, we may assume
that ϕ involves no atoms other than p1, . . . , pn, r.
(iii) ϕ is of the form ∀(pj , pk). If j = k, then ϕ ∈ Γ, by (23). If j 6= k, then
Ai 6|= ϕ by inspection.
(iv) ϕ is of the form ∀(pj , p¯k). If j = k, then Ai 6|= ϕ, since p
Ai
j 6= ∅. If j 6= k,
then ϕ ∈ Γ, by (24) and the identification ∀(pj , p¯k) = ∀(pk, p¯j).
(v) ϕ is of the form ∀(pj , ∀(pk, r)). If j = 1 and k = n, then ϕ ∈ Γ, by (22).
So we may assume that either j > 1 or k < n, in which case, k 6= j + 1 implies
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Ai 6|= ϕ, by inspection. Hence, we may assume that ϕ = ∀(pj , ∀(pj+1, r)), with
j < n. Let Bi,j be the structure obtained from Ai by adding a second point b
to the interpretation of pj+1, and to which pj is not related by r. In pictures:
p1
GF ED

// p2 // · · · pj // pj+1 // pj+2 // · · · // pi pi+1 // · · · pn
b
::
u
u
u
u
u
u
(This picture shows j + 2 < i. Similar pictures are possible in all other cases.)
By inspection, Bi,j |= ∆i, but Bi,j 6|= ϕ.
(vi) ϕ is of the form ∀(pj , ∃(pk, r)). If k = j+1, then ϕ ∈ Γ, by (21). Moreover,
if k 6= j + 1, then, unless j = 1 and k = n, Ai 6|= ϕ, by inspection. Hence we
may assume ϕ = ∀(p1, ∃(pn, r)). Let Ci be the structure:
p1 // p2 // · · · // pi,
with pCij = ∅ for all j (i < j 6 n). Then Ci |= ∆i, but Ci 6|= ϕ.
(vii) ϕ is of either of the forms ∀(pj , ∀(pk, r¯)), ∀(pj , ∃(pk, r¯)). Define A′′i to be
like Ai except that r
A
′′
i additionally contains the pair of points 〈pj , pk〉. By
inspection, A′′i |= ∆i, but A
′′
i 6|= ϕ.
(viii) ϕ is of the form ∃(p, c). Let A0 be a structure over any domain in which
every atom has empty extension. Then A0 |= ∆i, but A0 6|= ϕ.
This also completes the proof of Theorem 4.1.
4.2 A refutation-complete system for R
Theorem 4.1 notwithstanding, we exhibit below a finite set R of rules in R, such
that ⊢R is sound and refutation-complete. We remind the reader that p and q
range over unary atoms, c over c-terms, and t over binary literals.
∃(p, q) ∀(q, c)
∃(p, c)
(D1)
∀(p, q) ∀(q, c)
∀(p, c)
(B)
∀(p, q) ∃(p, c)
∃(q, c)
(D2)
∀(p, p)
(T)
∃(p, c)
∃(p, p)
(I)
∀(q, c¯) ∃(p, c)
∃(p, q¯)
(D3)
∀(p, p¯)
∀(p, c)
(A)
∃(p, ∃(q, t))
∃(q, q)
(II)
∀(p, ∀(q′, t)) ∃(q, q′)
∀(p, ∃(q, t))
(∀∀)
∃(p, ∃(q, t)) ∀(q, q′)
∃(p, ∃(q′, t))
(∃∃)
∀(p, ∃(q, t)) ∀(q, q′)
∀(p, ∃(q′, t))
(∀∃)
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Rules (D1), (D2), (D3), (B), (A), (T) and (I) are natural generalizations of
their namesakes in S. In contrast, (∀∀), (∃∃), (∀∃) and (II) express genuinely
relational logical principles. In some settings, these last rules are called mono-
tonicity principles. Because we seek only refutation-completeness for ⊢R, we do
not need a version of the rule (X).
To illustrate these rules, let n be any integer greater than 1, let
Γ∗ = {∀(pi, ∃(pi+1, r)) | 1 6 i < n} ∪ {∀(p1, ∀(pn, r))}
and let γ = ∀(p1, ∃(pn, r)). Noting that γ¯ = ∃(p1, ∀(pn, r¯)), we have the deriva-
tion (shown here for n > 3)
∀(p1, ∀(pn, r))
∃(p1, ∀(pn, r¯))
∃(p1, p1)
(I)
∀(p1, ∃(p2, r))
∃(p1, ∃(p2, r))
(D1)
∃(p2, p2)
(II)
∀(p2, ∃(p3, r))
∃(p2, ∃(p3, r))
(D1)
∃(p3, p3)
(II)
. . .
∃(pn, pn)
∀(p1, ∃(pn, r))
(∀∀)
∃(p1, ∀(pn, r¯))
∃(p1, p¯1)
(D3),
showing that Γ∗ ∪ {γ¯} ⊢R ⊥. By contrast, since Γ∗ ⊆ Γ, where Γ is the set of
formulas used in the proof of Theorem 4.1, we know that, for any finite set X of
syllogistic rules, n can be made sufficiently large that Γ∗ 6⊢X γ.
Starting on the proof For the remainder of this section, fix a finite, non-
empty set Γ of R-formulas. As usual, we take the (possibly decorated) variables
p, q to range over unary atoms, r over binary atoms, t over binary literals, and
c, d over c-terms. We write c ⇒ d if c = d or there exists a sequence of unary
atoms p0, . . . , pk such that c = p0, ∀(pk, d) ∈ Γ, and ∀(pi, pi+1) ∈ Γ for all i
(0 6 i < k). If V is a set of c-terms, write V ⇒ d if c⇒ d for some c ∈ V .
Lemma 4.3. Let V be a set of c-terms.
1. If V ⇒ c, then either c ∈ V or there exists p ∈ V such that Γ ⊢R ∀(p, c);
2. if V ⇒ p, then there exists p0 ∈ V such that Γ ⊢R ∀(p0, p);
3. if p⇒ c, then Γ ⊢R ∀(p, c).
Proof. Almost immediate, noting that R contains the rules (B) and (T).
In the ensuing lemmas, we show that, if Γ is consistent (with respect to ⊢R),
then Γ is satisfiable. As a first step, we create plenty of objects from which to
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construct a potential model of Γ. If 0 6 i 6 2 and V is a set of c-terms with
1 6 |V | 6 2, let bV,i denote some object or other, and assume that the various
bV,i are pairwise distinct. Now set
B0 = {b{p,c},0 | ∃(p, c) ∈ Γ}.
Lemma 4.4. Let bV,0 ∈ B0, and let p, c ∈ V . Then Γ ⊢R ∃(p, c).
Proof. If p 6= c, then V = {p, c} and ∃(p, c) ∈ Γ by construction. If p = c, then
V = {p, d} for some d, and we have the derivation
∃(p, d)
∃(p, p)
(I).
We now define sets B1, B2, . . . inductively as follows. Suppose Bk has been
defined. Let
Bk+1 = Bk∪{b{p},i | 1 6 i 6 2 and, for some bV,j ∈ Bk and some t, V ⇒ ∃(p, t)}.
Let B =
⋃
06k Bk. Evidently, B is finite. (Indeed, |B| is bounded by a linear
function of |Γ|.) It is immediate from the construction of B that, if bV,i ∈ B0,
then 1 6 |V | 6 2, V contains at least one unary atom p, and i = 0. On the
other hand, if bV,i ∈ Bk for k > 0, then V = {p} for some unary atom p, and i
is either 1 or 2. The intuition here is that the elements of B0 are witnesses for
the existential formulas of Γ, while the elements of Bk+1 are the witnesses for
existential c-terms satisfied by elements of Bk.
Lemma 4.5. If bV,i ∈ B, V ⇒ p and V ⇒ c, then Γ ⊢R ∃(p, c).
Proof. Let k be the smallest number such that bS,i ∈ Bk. We proceed by
induction on k.
For the case k = 0, we have bV,i = bV,0 ∈ B0. By Lemma 4.3 Part 2, there
exists q1 ∈ S such that Γ ⊢R ∀(q1, p). By Lemma 4.3 Part 1, either c ∈ V or
there exists q2 ∈ V such that Γ ⊢R ∀(q2, c). In the former case, Lemma 4.4
yields Γ ⊢R ∃(q1, c), so that we have the derivation
....
∃(q1, c)
....
∀(q1, p)
∃(p, c)
(D2).
In the latter case, Lemma 4.4 yields Γ ⊢R ∃(q1, q2), so that we have the derivation
....
∃(q1, q2)
....
∀(q2, c)
∃(q1, c)
(D1)
....
∀(q1, p)
∃(p, c)
(D2).
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For the case k > 0, bV,i ∈ Bk implies V = {pk} for some pk, and 1 6 i 6 2.
By construction of Bk, there exist bW,j ∈ Bk−1, pk−1 ∈ W and binary atom r,
such that W ⇒ ∃(pk, r). By inductive hypothesis, Γ ⊢R ∃(pk−1, ∃(pk, r)), and
by Lemma 4.3 Part 3, Γ ⊢R ∀(pk, p), and Γ ⊢R ∀(pk, c). Therefore, we have the
derivation
....
∃(pk−1, ∃(pk, r))
∃(pk, pk)
(II)
....
∀(pk, p)
∃(pk, p)
(D1)
....
∀(pk, c)
∃(p, c)
(D1).
Lemma 4.6. If bV,i ∈ B, V ⇒ c, V ⇒ d, and c 6= d, then there exists a unary
atom p such that either: (i) Γ ⊢R ∃(p, c) and Γ ⊢R ∀(p, d); or (ii) Γ ⊢R ∃(p, d)
and Γ ⊢R ∀(p, c).
Proof. Suppose first that c = q for some q. By Lemma 4.5, Γ ⊢R ∃(q, d), and
by rule (T), Γ ⊢R ∀(q, q). Putting p = q then satisfies Condition (ii). On the
other hand, if d = q for some q, then Condition (i) is satisfied, by a similar
argument. Hence we may assume that neither c nor d is a unary atom. Since
c 6= d, we have either c 6∈ V or d 6∈ V , by construction of B. If the latter, then,
by Lemma 4.3 Part 1, there exists p such that Γ ⊢R ∀(p, d). But now we have
V ⇒ p and V ⇒ c, so that, by Lemma 4.5, Γ ⊢R ∃(p, c), and Condition (i) is
satisfied. If, on the other hand, c 6∈ V , Condition (ii) is satisfied, by a similar
argument.
The set B will form the domain of a structure B, defined as follows. If p is
a unary atom, set
pB = {bV,i ∈ B | V ⇒ p};
and if r is a binary atom, set
rB = {〈bV,i, b{p},1〉 ∈ B
2 | V ⇒ ∃(p, r)}∪
{〈bV,i, bW,j〉 ∈ B
2 | for some q, V ⇒ ∀(q, r) and W ⇒ q}.
The intuition is that the elements b{p},1 are witnesses for the existential quan-
tifiers in c-terms of the form ∃(p, r), while the elements b{p},2 are witnesses for
the existential quantifiers in c-terms of the form ∃(p, r¯).
Lemma 4.7. If Γ is unsatisfiable, then there exist an element bV,i of B, a unary
atom p and a c-term c, such that V ⇒ p, V ⇒ c, bV,i ∈ pB and bV,i 6∈ cB.
Proof. Since Γ is unsatisfiable, let ϕ ∈ Γ be such that B 6|= Γ. If ϕ = ∃(p, c),
let V = {p, c}. Trivially, V ⇒ p and V ⇒ c. By construction of B, bV,0 ∈ B,
and by construction of B, bV,0 ∈ p
B, whence (since B 6|= ϕ) bV,0 6∈ c
B. If,
on the other hand, ϕ = ∀(p, c), there exists bV,i ∈ B such that bV,i ∈ pB and
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bV,i 6∈ cB. By construction of B, V ⇒ p; and since ∀(p, c) ∈ Γ, we have V ⇒ c,
as required.
We now prove the main Lemma, from which both the complexity and the
refutation-completeness results follow.
Lemma 4.8. If Γ is unsatisfiable, then the following condition holds.
(C) There exist elements bV,i, bW,j of B, unary atoms q, o, and binary
atom r, such that one of the following is true:
1. V ⇒ q and V ⇒ q¯;
2. V ⇒ ∃(q, r¯), V ⇒ ∀(o, r), and q ⇒ o;
3. V ⇒ ∀(q, r¯), V ⇒ ∃(o, r), and o⇒ q;
4. V ⇒ ∀(q, r¯), V ⇒ ∀(o, r), W ⇒ q, and W ⇒ o.
Proof. Let V , i, p and c be as in Lemma 4.7. We claim first that c cannot be
of the form q, ∃(q, r) or ∀(q, r). For consider each possibility in turn.
If c = q, then, by the construction ofB, V ⇒ c implies bV,i ∈ qB, contradicting
bV,i 6∈ c
B.
If c = ∃(q, r), then, by the construction of B, V ⇒ c implies b{q},1 ∈ B,
b{q},1 ∈ q
B, and 〈bV,i, b{q},1〉 ∈ r
B, whence bV,i ∈ ∃(q, r)B, contradicting
b 6∈ cB.
If c = ∀(q, r), then, since V ⇒ c, the construction of B ensures that, for
any bW,j ∈ q
B, we have W ⇒ q and hence 〈bV,i, bW,j〉 ∈ r
B. That is,
bV,i ∈ ∀(q, r)B, contradicting b 6∈ cB.
Therefore, c is of one of the forms q¯, ∃(q, r¯), or ∀(q, r¯). We consider each
possibility in turn, and show that one of the four cases of Condition (C) holds.
If c = q¯, then bV,i 6∈ cB means that bV,i ∈ qB, so that, by construction of B,
V ⇒ q. But by assumption, V ⇒ c, and we have Case 1 of Condition (C).
If c = ∃(q, r¯), then, since V ⇒ c, we have, by the construction ofB, b{q},2 ∈ B,
and in fact b{q},2 ∈ q
B. Since bV,i 6∈ cB, we have 〈bV,i, b{q},2〉 ∈ r
B. The
construction ofB then guarantees that for some unary atom o, V ⇒ ∀(o, r)
and q ⇒ o; thus we have Case 2 of Condition (C).
If c = ∀(q, r¯), then bV,i 6∈ cB implies that there exists bW,j ∈ B such that
bW,j ∈ qB and 〈bV,i, bW,j〉 ∈ rB. By construction of B, W ⇒ q, and, for
some unary atom o, either
(a) V ⇒ ∃(o, r), W = {o} and j = 1, or
(b) V ⇒ ∀(o, r) and W ⇒ o.
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But these yield Cases 3 and 4 of Condition (C), respectively.
Lemma 4.9. The following are equivalent:
1. Γ ⊢R ⊥;
2. Γ is unsatisfiable;
3. Condition (C) of Lemma 4.8 holds.
Proof. For the implication 1 ⇒ 2, we observe that ⊢R is obviously sound. The
implication 2⇒ 3 is Lemma 4.8. For the implication 3⇒ 1, suppose Condition
(C) of Lemma 4.8 holds. This condition has four cases: we consider each in
turn, showing that Γ ⊢R ∃(p, p¯) for some unary atom p.
1. V ⇒ q and V ⇒ q¯. By Lemma 4.5 we immediately have Γ ⊢R ∃(q, q¯).
2. V ⇒ ∃(q, r¯), V ⇒ ∀(o, r), q ⇒ o. By Lemma 4.3 Part 2 (or Part 3),
Γ ⊢R ∀(q, o), and by Lemma 4.6, there exists p such that either: (i) Γ ⊢R
∃(p, ∃(q, r¯)) and Γ ⊢R ∀(p, ∀(o, r)); or (ii) Γ ⊢R ∃(p, ∀(o, r)) and Γ ⊢R
∀(p, ∃(q, r¯)).
In Case (i), we then have
....
∃(p, ∃(q, r¯))
....
∀(q, o)
∃(p, ∃(o, r¯))
(∃∃)
....
∀(p, ∀(o, r))
∃(p, p¯)
(D3),
while in Case (ii), we have
....
∃(p, ∀(o, r))
....
∀(p, ∃(q, r¯))
....
∀(q, o)
∀(p, ∃(o, r¯))
(∀∃)
∃(p, p¯)
(D3).
3. V ⇒ ∀(q, r¯), V ⇒ ∃(o, r), o ⇒ q. By Lemma 4.3 Part 2 (or Part 3),
Γ ⊢R ∀(o, q), and by Lemma 4.6, there exists p such that either: (i) Γ ⊢R
∃(p, ∃(o, r)) and Γ ⊢R ∀(p, ∀(q, r¯)); or (ii) Γ ⊢R ∃(p, ∀(q, r¯)) and Γ ⊢R
∀(p, ∃(o, r)). But then we can employ exactly the same derivation patterns
as for Cases 2(i) and 2(ii), respectively.
4. V ⇒ ∀(q, r¯), V ⇒ ∀(o, r), W ⇒ q, W ⇒ o. By Lemma 4.6, there exists p
such that Γ ⊢R ∃(p, ∀(p1, u)) and Γ ⊢R ∀(p, ∀(p2, u¯)), where u is either r or
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r¯, and p1 and p2 are q and o in some order. By Lemma 4.5, Γ ⊢R ∃(o, q),
i.e. Γ ⊢R ∃(p1, p2). Thus we have the derivation
....
∀(p, ∀(p2, u¯))
....
∃(p1, p2)
∀(p, ∃(p1, u¯))
(∀∀)
....
∃(p, ∀(p1, u))
∃(p, p¯)
(D3).
(26)
Theorem 4.10. The derivation relation ⊢R is sound and refutation-complete
for R.
Proof. Soundness is obvious. Refutation-completeness is the implication from
2 to 1 in Lemma 4.9.
Theorem 4.11. The problem of determining the validity of a sequent in any of
the fragments S, S† and R is NLogSpace-complete.
Proof. The lower bound is obtained by reduction of the reachability problem
for directed graphs to the validity problem for S. If G = (V,E) is a directed
graph, take the nodes V to be unary atoms. Let ΘG = {∀(u, v) | (u, v) ∈ E}.
It is easy to check that ΘG |= ∀(u, v) if and only if v reachable from u.
Recall that, by the Immerman-Szelepcse´nyi Theorem, NLogSpace is closed
under complementation. The upper bound for S† is then immediate, since
the problem of determining the satisfiability of a given set of S†-formulas is
(almost trivially) reducible to the problem 2SAT, which is well known to be
NLogSpace-complete. (See, for example, Papadimitriou [16], pp. 185 and 398.)
It remains only to establish the upper bound for R. For this, it suffices
to show that the problem of determining the unsatisfiability of a given set Γ of
R-formulas is in NLogSpace. Let Γ be a set of R-formulas. Let B and B be as
defined for Lemmas 4.4–4.9. Lemma 4.9 guarantees that Γ is unsatisfiable if and
only if there exist bS,i, bT,j ∈ B, unary atoms q, o, and a binary atom r satisfying
one of the four cases in Condition (C) of Lemma 4.8. Nondeterministically guess
these V , W , i, j, q, o and r. This requires only logarithmic space, because only
the indices of the relevant atoms need to be encoded, and the size of B is linear in
the number of formulas in Γ. To check that bV,i, bW,j ∈ B is essentially a graph-
reachability problem, as are all the requirements in the four cases of Condition
(C). Since graph reachability is in NLogSpace, this proves the theorem.
5 R∗: an indirect system
Next, we consider the fragment R∗. We refer the reader to Figure 2 for a
review of the syntax of this fragment. The complexity-theoretic analysis of
R∗ has been done for us. It is contained in the more expressive logic (also
inspired by natural language syntax) investigated in McAllester and Givan [10],
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whose satisfiability problem is shown to be NPTime-complete. Inspection of
McAllester and Givan’s NPTime-hardness proof (op. cit. pp. 12–14) reveals
that it employs only formulas in our fragment R∗; hence that the lower bound
applies to R∗ too. In other words:
Proposition 5.1 (McAllester and Givan). The problem of determining the
validity of a sequent in the fragment R∗ is co-NPTime-complete.
Proposition 5.1 is significant not least because of what we know about the
complexity of searching for derivations in direct syllogistic systems.
Corollary 5.2. If PTime6=NPTime, then there exists no finite set X of syllo-
gistic rules in R∗ such that ⊢X is both sound and refutation-complete.
Proof. Proposition 5.1 and Lemma 2.1.
Let R∗ be the following set of syllogistic rules in R∗. Our result is that
the indirect derivation relation R∗ is complete. In the following, the variables
b+, c+ range over positive c-terms, and d over c-terms. (As usual, p, q range
over unary atoms and r over binary atoms.)
∀(c+, c+)
(T)
∃(c+, d)
∃(c+, c+)
(I)
∀(b+, c+) ∀(c+, d)
∀(b+, d)
(B)
∃(b+, c+) ∀(c+, d)
∃(b+, d)
(D1)
∀(b+, c+) ∃(b+, d)
∃(c+, d)
(D2)
∀(p, q)
∀(∀(q, r), ∀(p, r))
(J)
∀(p, q)
∀(∃(p, r), ∃(q, r))
(K)
∃(p, q)
∀(∀(p, r), ∃(q, r))
(L)
∃(q, ∃(p, r))
∃(p, p)
(II)
∀(p, p¯)
∀(c+, ∀(p, r))
(Z)
∀(p, p¯)
∃((∀(p, r), ∀(p, r))
(W)
Rules (D1), (D2), (B), (T) and (I) are natural generalizations of their namesakes
in R. Rules (J), (K), and (L) embody logical principles that are intuitively
clear, yet not familiar when taken as single steps. If all porcupines are brown
animals, then everything which attacks all brown animals attacks all porcupines
(J), and everything which photographs some porcupine photographs some brown
animal (K). And if some porcupines are brown animals, then everything which
caresses all porcupines caresses some brown animals (L). We have already seen
(II). Rule (Z) tells that if there are no porcupines (say), then all farmers love
all porcupines. Rule (W) tells us that under this same assumption, there is
something which loves all porcupines (simply because we assume the universe is
non-empty, and everything in it vacuously loves all porcupines). If we did not
assume that the universe of a model is non-empty, then we would drop (W),
and the completeness of the resulting system would be proved the same way.
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All the rules of R are derivable in R∗ . For example, here is a proof of (A):
[∃(p, d¯)]1
∃(p, p)
(I)
∀(p, p¯)
∃(p, p¯)
(D1)
∀(p, d)
(RAA)1
The rest of this section is devoted to a proof that R∗ is sound and complete
for R∗.
Starting the proof To prove completeness, we need only show that every
consistent set Γ in the fragment R∗ is satisfiable. Also, by Lemma 2.2, we may
assume that Γ is R∗-complete. For the remainder of this section, fix some R∗-
complete set of formulas Γ which is consistent with respect to R∗ . We simplify
our notation to write ⊢ for R∗ .
We shall construct a structure A and prove that it satisfies Γ. First, let C+
be the set of positive c-terms. Then we define A by:
A = {〈c1, c2, Q〉 ∈ C+ ×C+ × {∀, ∃} : Γ ⊢ ∃(c1, c2)}
pA = {〈c1, c2, Q〉 ∈ A : Γ ⊢ ∀(c1, p) or Γ ⊢ ∀(c2, p)}
〈c1, c2, Q1〉rA(d1, d2, Q2) iff either (a) for some i, j, and q ∈ P,
Γ ⊢ ∀(ci, ∀(q, r)) and Γ ⊢ ∀(dj , q);
or else (b) Q2 = ∃, and for some i and q ∈ P,
d1 = d2 = q, and Γ ⊢ ∀(ci, ∃(q, r)).
Note that the set A is non-empty. For let p ∈ P. If Γ ⊢ ∃(p, p), then 〈p, p, ∀〉 ∈
A. Otherwise, Γ ⊢ ∀(p, p¯), and so for all binary atoms r, Γ ⊢ ∃(∀(p, r), ∀(p, r))
by (W). Thus 〈c, c, ∀〉 ∈ A, where c is ∀(p, r).
Lemma 5.3. For all c ∈ C+,
cA = {〈d1, d2, Q〉 ∈ A : either Γ ⊢ ∀(d1, c), or Γ ⊢ ∀(d2, c)}.
Proof. The result for c a unary atom is immediate. We often shall use the
resulting fact that if Γ ⊢ ∃(p, p), then pA 6= ∅; it contains both 〈p, p, ∀〉 and
〈p, p, ∃〉. The main work concerns c-terms of the form ∀(p, r) and ∃(p, r). We
remark that all c-terms referred to in this proof are positive.
We begin with c = ∀(p, r). Let 〈d1, d2, Q〉 ∈ ∀(p, r)A. Now, either Γ ⊢ ∃(p, p)
or Γ 6⊢ ∃(p, p). If the former, then 〈p, p, ∀〉 ∈ pA. By the semantics of our
fragment, 〈d1, d2, Q〉rA〈p, p, ∀〉. By the structure of A, there are i and q giving
the derivation from Γ as in the tree on the left below:
....
∀(di, ∀(q, r))
....
∀(p, q)
∀(∀(q, r), ∀(p, r))
(J)
∀(di, ∀(p, r))
(B)
....
∀(p, p¯)
∀(dj , ∀(p, r))
(Z).
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This shows that Γ ⊢ ∀(di, ∀(p, r)). On the other hand, if Γ 6⊢ ∃(p, p), we use the
assumption that Γ is complete to assert that Γ ⊢ ∀(p, p¯). And then we have the
derivation from Γ on the right above, for both j.
Conversely, fix i and suppose that Γ ⊢ ∀(di, ∀(p, r)). We claim that 〈d1, d2, Q〉
belongs to ∀(p, r)A. For this, take any 〈b1, b2, Q
′〉 ∈ pA so that Γ ⊢ ∀(bj , p) for
some j. (We are thus using b1 and b2 to range over positive c-terms, just as the
c’s and d’s do.) Then p, i and j show that 〈d1, d2, Q〉rA〈b1, b2, Q′〉. This for all
elements of pA shows that 〈d1, d2, Q〉 ∈ ∀(p, r)A.
We next prove the statement of our lemma for c = ∃(p, r).
Let 〈d1, d2, Q〉 ∈ ∃(p, r)A. Thus we have 〈d1, d2, Q〉rA〈b1, b2, Q′〉 for some
〈b1, b2, Q′〉 ∈ pA. We first consider case (a) in the definition of our structure
A: there are i, j, and q so that Γ ⊢ ∀(di, ∀(q, r)) and Γ ⊢ ∀(bj , q). We have
Γ ⊢ ∃(b1, b2), since 〈b1, b2, Q
′〉 ∈ A. Further, let k be such that Γ ⊢ ∀(bk, p). We
show the desired conclusion using a derivation from Γ:
....
∀(di, ∀(q, r))
....
∃(b1, b2)
∃(bk, bj)
....
∀(bj , q)
∃(bk, q)
(D1)
....
∀(bk, p)
∃(q, p)
(D1)
∀(∀(q, r), ∃(p, r))
(L)
∀(di, ∃(p, r))
(B)
This concludes the work in case (a). In case (b), Q′ = ∃, there is some
q ∈ P such that b1 = b2 = q, and for some i, Γ ⊢ ∀(di, ∃(q, r)). Again we have
Γ ⊢ ∀(q, p). So we have a derivation from Γ as follows:
....
∀(di, ∃(q, r))
....
∀(q, p)
∀(∃(q, r), ∃(p, r))
(K)
∀(di, ∃(p, r))
(B)
At this point, we know that if 〈d1, d2, Q〉 ∈ ∃(p, r)A, then Γ ⊢ ∀(di, ∃(p, r))
for some i. We now verify the converse. Let 〈d1, d2, Q〉 ∈ A, and fix i such that
Γ ⊢ ∀(di, ∃(p, r)). Then Γ ⊢ ∃(d1, d2). We thus have a derivation from Γ:
....
∃(d1, d2)
∃(di, di)
(I)
....
∀(di, ∃(p, r))
∃(di, ∃(p, r))
(D1)
∃(p, p)
(II)
This goes to show that 〈p, p, ∃〉 ∈ A. By the construction ofA, 〈d1, d2, Q〉rA〈p, p, ∃〉,
and 〈p, p, ∃〉 ∈ pA. So 〈d1, d2, Q〉 ∈ ∃(p, r)A. This completes the proof.
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Lemma 5.4. A |= Γ.
Proof. The proof is by cases on the various formula types in R∗. Using the
fact that formulas ∃(e, f) and ∃(f, e) are identified, and similarly for ∀(e¯, f¯) and
∀(f, e), we may take all R∗-formulas to have one of the forms:
∀(c+, d+), ∀(c+, d+), ∃(c+, d+), ∃(c+, d+),
where c+ and d+ range over positive c-terms. In the remainder of the proof, we
omit the +-superscripts for clarity: i.e. c and d range over positive c-terms.
Let ϕ ∈ Γ be ∀(c, d). Using (B) and Lemma 5.3, we see that cA ⊆ dA.
Let ϕ ∈ Γ be ∀(c, d¯). Suppose towards a contradiction that A 6|= ϕ. Let
〈b1, b2, Q〉 ∈ cA ∩ dA. Let i and j be such that Γ ⊢ ∀(bi, c) and Γ ⊢ ∀(bj , d).
Then using (B), Γ ⊢ ∀(bi, d¯). And since Γ ⊢ ∃(bi, bj), we use (D1) to see that
Γ ⊢ ∃(d, d¯). So Γ is inconsistent, a contradiction.
If ϕ ∈ Γ is ∃(c, d), then (c, d, ∃) ∈ A. Indeed, (c, d, ∃) ∈ cA ∩dA, by Rule (T)
and Lemma 5.3.
Finally, consider the case when ϕ ∈ Γ is of the form ∃(c, d¯). Then, using (I),
Γ ⊢ ∃(c, c), so 〈c, c, ∀〉 ∈ A. Suppose towards a contradiction that A |= ∀(c, d).
Then 〈c, c, ∀〉 ∈ dA. But then we have Γ ⊢ ∀(c, d), by Lemma 5.3 again. One
application of (D2) now shows that Γ ⊢ ∃(d, d¯). Thus we have a contradiction
to the consistency of Γ.
Hence, we have shown that any consistent set Γ of R∗-formulas has a model.
Therefore:
Theorem 5.5. The derivation relation R∗ is sound and complete for R∗.
6 R† and R∗†: no indirect systems
Our last fragments are R† and R∗†. We open with some simple complexity
results, showing that these fragments have no direct syllogistic proof-system
which is both sound and refutation-complete. After this, we strengthen the
result to show that there are no indirect syllogistic proof-systems, either. The
proof of this negative result is similar to what we saw earlier in Theorem 4.1 for
R, but the argument here is more intricate.
Lemma 6.1. The problem of determining the validity of a sequent in R† is
ExpTime-hard.
Proof. The logic KU is the basic modal logic K together with an additional
modality U (for “universal”), whose semantics are given by the standard rela-
tional (Kripke) semantics, plus
|=w Uϕ if and only if |=w′ ϕ for all worlds w′.
The satisfiability problem forKU is ExpTime-hard. (The proof is an easy adap-
tation of the corresponding result for propositional dynamic logic; see, e.g. Harel
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et al. [7]: 216 ff.) It suffices, therefore, to reduce this problem to satisfiability in
R†. Let ϕ be a formula of KU .
We first transform ϕ into an equisatisfiable set of formulas Tϕ ∪ Sϕ of first-
order logic; then we translate the formulas of Tϕ ∪ Sϕ into an equisatisfiable
set of R†-formulas. To simplify the notation, we shall take unary atoms (in
R†) to be unary predicates (in first-order logic); similarly, we take binary atoms
to do double duty as binary predicates. Let r and e be binary atoms. For any
KU -formula ψ, let pψ be a unary atom, and define the set of first-order formulas
Tψ inductively as follows:
Tp = ∅ (where p is a proposition letter)
Tψ∧pi =
Tψ ∪ Tpi ∪ {∀x(pψ(x) ∧ ppi(x)→ pψ∧pi(x)),
∀x(pψ∧pi(x)→ pψ(x)), ∀x(pψ∧pi(x)→ ppi(x))}
T¬ψ = Tψ ∪ {∀x(p¬ψ(x)→ ¬pψ(x)), ∀x(¬p¬ψ(x)→ pψ(x))}
Tψ =
Tψ ∪ {∀x(pψ(x)→ ∀y(¬pψ(y)→ ¬r(x, y))),
∀x(¬pψ(x)→ ∃y(¬pψ(y) ∧ r(x, y)))}
TUψ =
Tψ ∪ {∀x(pUψ(x)→ ∀y(¬pψ(y)→ ¬e(x, y))),
∀x(¬pUψ(x)→ ∃y(¬pψ(y) ∧ e(x, y)))}.
Now let Sϕ be the collection of five first-order formulas
∃x(pϕ(x) ∧ pϕ(x)), ∀x(±pϕ(x)→ ∀y(±pϕ(y)→ e(x, y))).
(Although the first formula looks like it has a redundant conjunct, we state it in
this way only to make our work below a little easier.) We claim that the modal
formula ϕ is satisfiable if and only if the set of first-order formulas Tϕ ∪ Sϕ is
satisfiable. For let M be any (Kripke) model of ϕ over a frame (W,R). Define
the first-order structure A with domain W , by setting rA = R, eA = A2, and
pAψ = {w | M |=w ψ}, for any subformula ψ of ϕ. It is then easy to check that
A |= Tϕ∪Sϕ. Conversely, suppose A |= Tϕ∪Sϕ. We build a Kripke structure M
over the frame (A, rA) by setting, for any proposition letter o mentioned in ϕ,
M |=a o if and only if a ∈ pAo . A straightforward structural induction establishes
that for any subformula ψ of ϕ, M |=a ψ if and only if a ∈ pAψ . The formula
∃x(pϕ(x) ∧ pϕ(x)) ∈ Sϕ then ensures that ϕ is satisfied in M.
Now, all of the formulas in Tϕ ∪ Sϕ are of one of the forms
∀x(±p(x) → ±q(x)) ∀x(±p(x)→ ∀y(±q(y)→ ±r(x, y))) (27)
∃x(p(x) ∧ p(x)) ∀x(±p(x)→ ∃y(±q(y) ∧ r(x, y))) (28)
∀x(p(x) ∧ q(x)→ o(x)). (29)
Notice that formulas of the forms (27) and (28) translate (in the obvious sense)
directly into the fragment R†; those of form (29), by contrast, do not. The next
step is to eliminate formulas of this last type.
Let o∗ be a new unary relation symbol. For θ ∈ Tϕ ∪ Sϕ of the form (29),
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let rθ be a new binary atom, and define Rθ to be the set of formulas
∀x(¬o(x) → ∃z(o∗(z) ∧ rθ(x, z))) (30)
∀x(p(x)→ ∀z(¬p(z)→ ¬rθ(x, z))) (31)
∀x(q(x) → ∀z(p(z)→ ¬rθ(x, z))), (32)
which are all of the forms in (27) or (28). It is easy to check that Rθ |= θ. For
suppose (for contradiction) that A |= Rθ and a satisfies p and q but not o in
A. By (30), there exists b such that A |= rθ[a, b]. If A 6|= p[b], then (31) is false
in A; on the other hand, if A |= p[b], then (32) is false in A. Thus, Rθ |= θ as
claimed. Conversely, if A |= θ, expand A to a structure A′ by interpreting o∗
and rθ as follows:
(o∗)A = A
rAθ = {〈a, a〉 | A 6|= o[a]}.
We check that A′ |= Rθ. Formula (30) is true, because A′ 6|= o[a] implies
A′ |= rθ[a, a]. Formula (31) is true, because A′ |= rθ[a, b] implies a = b. To
see that Formula (32) is true, suppose A′ |= q[a] and A′ |= p[b]. If a = b, then
A |= o[a] (since A′ |= θ); that is, either a 6= b or A |= o[a]. By construction,
then, A′ 6|= rθ[a, b].
Now let T ∗ϕ be the result of replacing all formulas θ in Tϕ of form (29)
with the corresponding trio Rθ. (The binary atoms rθ for the various θ are
assumed to be distinct; however, the same unary atom o∗ can be used for all
θ.) By the previous paragraph, T ∗ϕ ∪ Sϕ is satisfiable if and only if Tϕ ∪ Sϕ
is satisfiable, and hence if and only if ϕ is satisfiable. But T ∗ϕ ∪ Sϕ is a set of
formulas of the forms (27) and (28), and can evidently be translated into a set
of R†-formulas satisfied in exactly the same structures. Moreover, this set can
be computed in time bounded by a polynomial function of ‖ϕ‖. This completes
the reduction.
We note the following fact. (We omit a detailed proof, since subsequent
developments do not hinge on this result.)
Lemma 6.2. The problem of determining the validity of a sequent in R∗† is in
ExpTime.
Proof. Trivial adaptation of Pratt-Hartmann [17], Theorem 3, which considers
a fragment obtained by adding relative clauses to the relational syllogistic.
Theorem 6.3. The problem of determining the validity of a sequent in either
of the fragments R† and R∗† is ExpTime-complete.
Proof. Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2.
Corollary 6.4. There exists no finite set X of syllogistic rules in either R† or
R∗† such that ⊢X is both sound and refutation-complete.
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Figure 3: The structure A(n). Every element inside the dotted box is related by
r to u2.
Proof. It is a standard result that PTime6=ExpTime. The result is then im-
mediate by Lemmas 2.1 and 6.1.
Of course, Corollary 6.4 leaves open the possibility that there exist indirect
syllogistic systems that are sound and complete for R† and R∗†. To show that
there do not, stronger methods are required. That is the task of the remainder
of this section.
Starting on the proof Let n > 2; let o1, o2, o3, q1, q2, p1, . . . , pn be unary
atoms, and r, s binary atoms; and let A(n) be the set {a1, . . . , an, a′1, . . . , a
′
n, u0,
u1, u2, u3, u4, v1, v2}. We take the structure A(n), with domain A(n), to be as
depicted in Fig. 3. Here, membership of an element in pA
(n)
(where p is any
unary atom) is indicated by writing p in a box next to that element. The
extensions of the binary atoms r and s are depicted similarly: we indicate that
a pair of elements is in rA
(n)
by writing r next to an arrow between those
elements (and likewise for s). The r-labelled arrow from the dotted box to the
element u2 is to be interpreted as follows: for any element a inside the dotted
box, 〈a, u2〉 ∈ rA
(n)
. Thus, A(n) contains two ‘r-chains’ of elements satisfying,
successively, p1, . . . , pn: the elements of the first chain additionally satisfy q1
but not q2; those of the second chain additionally satisfy q2 but not q1. The
terminal elements of the two r-chains are related, by s, to the elements v1 and
v2. There are also some additional ‘out-lier’ elements, which ensure the truth
of various existential formulas in A: for example, u1 ensures (together with u0)
the truth of ∃(o1, ∃(p1, r¯)); u2 ensures the truth of ∃(q1, q2), and so on. In the
sequel, we define structures containing additional elements, which make almost
the same R∗†-formulas true as A(n). These latter structures will then be used
to show that there can be no sound and complete indirect syllogistic system for
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R∗ or R∗†.
To avoid notational clutter, we drop the superscripts in A(n) (and in related
constructions) where the value of n does not matter. By inspection, we have
A |= ∀(o1, ∃(q1, r)) (33)
A |= ∀(o1, ∀(p¯1, r¯)) (34)
A |= ∀(q1, ∀(q¯1, r¯)) (35)
A |= ∀(q2, ∀(q¯2, r¯)) (36)
A |= ∀(pi, ∃(pi+1, r)) (1 6 i < n) (37)
A |= ∀(q1, ∀(o3, s¯)) (38)
A |= ∀(q2, ∀(o¯3, s¯)) (39)
A |= ∀(pn, ∃(o2, s)). (40)
For any structure C, denote by Th(C) the set of R†-formulas true in C, and
denote by Th∗(C) the set ofR∗†-formulas true in C. Recall that a set of formulas
Φ is R†-complete (or R∗†-complete) if, for every R†-formula (respectively, R∗†-
formula) ϕ, either ϕ ∈ Φ or ϕ¯ ∈ Φ. Trivially, for any C, Th(C) is R†-complete,
and Th∗(C) is R∗†-complete.
Let γ be the R†-formula given by
γ = ∀(o1, ∃(q¯2, r)).
Noting that oA1 = {u0}, 〈u0, a1〉 ∈ r
A, and a1 6∈ qA2 , we have A |= γ (i.e.
γ ∈ Th(A)). Let Γ(n) be obtained from Th(A(n)) by reversing the truth-value
of γ, and similarly for Γ∗(n). That is:
Γ(n) =
(
Th
(
A
(n)
)
\ {γ}
)
∪ {γ¯}
Γ∗(n) =
(
Th∗
(
A
(n)
)
\ {γ}
)
∪ {γ¯}.
Again, we drop the (n)-superscript when the value of n does not matter. Thus,
Γ is R†-complete and Γ∗ is R∗†-complete.
Lemma 6.5. Γ (and therefore Γ∗) is unsatisfiable.
Proof. Noting that γ¯ is the formula ∃(o1, ∀(q¯2, r¯)), from (33) and (34), we see
that, in any model B |= Γ, there exists b ∈ pB1 ∩ q
B
1 ∩ q
B
2 . From (35)–(37), it
then follows that, in any model B |= Γ, there exists b ∈ pBn ∩ q
B
1 ∩ q
B
2 . But,
from (38)–(40), no model B |= Γ can have any element b ∈ pBn ∩ q
B
1 ∩ q
B
2 . This
proves the lemma.
Fixing n > 2, for any i (1 6 i < n), let B
(n)
i = A
(n) ∪ {b1, . . . , bi, u5}, and
consider the structure B
(n)
i , with domain B
(n)
i , depicted in Fig. 4. We employ
the same notational conventions as in Fig. 3. In particular, the r-labelled arrows
from the dotted boxes are to be interpreted as follows: for any element a inside
either of the dotted boxes, 〈a, u2〉 ∈ rB
(n)
i . Again, we drop superscripts where
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Figure 4: The structure Bi. Every element inside either of the dotted boxes is
related by r to u2.
the value of n does not matter. The structure Bi contains a copy of A, but has
an additional r-chain whose elements satisfy both q1 and q2; notice, however,
that this additional r-chain stops at the ith element.
We employ the following terminology. An existential formula is one of the
form ∃(e, f). If ϕ = ∃(e, f) and C a structure, then a witness for C |= ϕ is
any a ∈ C such that a ∈ eC and a ∈ fC. Now, we saw above that A |= γ; by
contrast Bi |= γ¯ (γ¯ is an existential formula, and u5 is a witness). Let δi be the
R†-formula given by
δi = ∀(pi, ∃(pi+1, r)).
We observed in (37) that A |= δi. By contrast, Bi |= δ¯i (δ¯i is an existential
formula, and bi is a witness). However, it turns out that γ and δi are the only
differences between A and Bi as far as R∗† is concerned:
Lemma 6.6. For all i (1 6 i < n):
Th
(
B
(n)
i
)
=
(
Th
(
A
(n)
)
\ {γ, δi}
)
∪ {γ¯, δ¯i};
similarly,
Th∗
(
B
(n)
i
)
=
(
Th∗
(
A
(n)
)
\ {γ, δi}
)
∪ {γ¯, δ¯i}.
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Proof. Since γ, δi, γ¯, δ¯i are all in R†, the first of these statements follows in-
stantly from the second. We proceed, therefore, to establish the second state-
ment.
We first prove the statement for the case i = 1. Notice that here, the third
r-‘chain’ in B
(n)
1 contains just one element, b1. Our initial goal, then, is to show
that Th∗(B
(n)
1 ) = (Th
∗(A(n)) \ {γ, δ1}) ∪ {γ¯, δ¯1}. The basic intuition is simple:
on the one hand, we may check the cases n = 2 and n = 3 by brute force;
on the other, we see from Fig. 4 that, once the ends of the first two r-chains
are sufficiently distant from the elements u5 and b1, extending those r-chains
further will have no effect on the differences between the formulas made true in
A(n) and B
(n)
1 .
To make this idea rigorous, we first establish three simple claims. We employ
the following terminology. An existential e-term is one of the form ∃(l, t). (As
usual, l ranges over unary literals, and t over binary literals.) If e = ∃(l, t), C is
a structure, and a ∈ C, then a witness for a ∈ eC is any b ∈ C such that b ∈ lC
and 〈a, b〉 ∈ tC.
Claim 6.7. Let a be any element of A(n) (n > 2), and e any e-term. Then
a ∈ eB
(n)
1 if and only if a ∈ eA
(n)
.
Proof. We prove the only-if direction by induction on n. The if-direction then
follows by considering the e-term e¯. The case n = 2 is checked by brute force.
(We used a computer.) Assume the claim is true for n = m > 2; we show
that it is true for n = m + 1. Let a ∈ A(m+1). For contradiction, suppose
a ∈ eB
(m+1)
1 , but a 6∈ eA
(m+1)
. Then e is existential, and a ∈ eB
(m+1)
1 has a
witness in B
(m+1)
1 \ A
(m+1). Writing e = ∃(l, t), there exists b ∈ {u5, b1} such
that b ∈ lB
(m+1)
1 and 〈a, b〉 ∈ tB
(m+1)
1 . In that case, if a ∈ A(m), we obviously
have a ∈ eB
(m)
1 , whence a ∈ eA
(m)
by inductive hypothesis, whence a ∈ eA
(m+1)
,
since A(m) is a sub-model of A(m+1)—a contradiction. Thus, a is either am+1
or a′m+1. But, by inspection of Fig. 4 (bearing in mind i = 1), it is easy to
see that, for a ∈ {am+1, a′m+1}, if a ∈ e
B
(m+1)
1 with a witness in {u5, b1}, then
a ∈ eA
(m+1)
with a witness in {u0, u2, a1, a
′
1}— again, a contradiction.
Claim 6.8. Let ϕ be any existential formula other than δ¯1, and let A0 =
{a1, a′1, u2}. If b1 is a witness for B
(n)
1 |= ϕ, then there exists a ∈ A0 such
that a is a witness for A(n) |= ϕ.
Proof. By induction on n. The cases n = 2 and n = 3 are checked by brute
force. (We used a computer.) Note in passing that the condition that ϕ is not
δ¯1 is required for these cases. Suppose now the claim holds for n = m > 3;
we show that it holds for n = m + 1. If e is any e-term, let eˆ be the result
of replacing any occurrence of the unary atom pm+1 by the unary atom pm.
Writing ϕ = ∃(e, f), let ϕˆ = ∃(eˆ, fˆ). Note that, since m > 3 and ϕ 6= δ¯1, we
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have ϕˆ 6= δ¯1. The following facts are obvious (see Figs. 3 and 4):
a ∈ eA
(m+1)
iff a ∈ eˆA
(m)
for all a ∈ A0
b1 ∈ e
B
(m+1)
1 iff b1 ∈ eˆ
B
(m)
1 .
It follows that, if b1 is a witness for B
(m+1)
1 |= ϕ, then b1 is a witness for
B
(m)
1 |= ϕˆ, whence, by inductive hypothesis, there exists a ∈ A0 such that a is
a witness for A(m) |= ϕˆ, whence there exists a ∈ A0 such that a is a witness for
A
(m+1) |= ϕ. This completes the induction.
Claim 6.9. Let ϕ be any existential formula other than γ¯, and let A0 =
{u0, u2, u3}. If u5 is a witness for B
(n)
1 |= ϕ, then there exists a ∈ A0 such
that a is a witness for A(n) |= ϕ.
Proof. Identical in structure to the proof of Claim 6.8.
We can now prove Lemma 6.6 in the case i = 1. Claim 6.7 shows that any
existential formula true in A(n) is true in B
(n)
1 , and moreover, that if ϕ is an
existential formula true in B
(n)
1 but false in A
(n), then either either u5 or b1 is
a witness. But these possibilities are ruled out—except in the cases ϕ = γ¯ and
ϕ = δ¯1—by Claims 6.8 and 6.9, respectively. Finally, if ϕ is universal (and not
equal to γ or δ1), then ϕ¯ is existential (and not equal to γ¯ or δ¯1). The foregoing
analysis shows that A(n) and B
(n)
1 agree on the truth value of ϕ¯, hence on the
truth value of ϕ.
We have thus proved the lemma for i = 1 and all values of n. Fix n > 3, and
consider now the structure B
(n)
2 , which differs from B
(n)
1 only in that the third
r-chain has been extended from one to two elements. By inspection of Fig. 4,
the only effect on the set of sentences made true is to restore the truth of δ1
and to falsify δ2. That is:
Th∗
(
B
(n)
2
)
=
(
Th∗
(
B
(n)
1
)
\ {δ¯1, δ2}
)
∪ {δ1, δ¯2}
=
(
Th∗
(
A
(n)
)
\ {γ, δ2}
)
∪ {γ¯, δ¯2}.
Proceeding in the same way, we have, for all i (1 6 i < n− 1),
Th∗
(
B
(n)
i+1
)
=
(
Th∗
(
B
(n)
i
)
\ {δ¯i, δi+1}
)
∪ {δi, δ¯i+1}
=
(
Th∗
(
A
(n)
)
\ {γ, δi+1}
)
∪ {γ¯, δ¯i+1}.
This proves the lemma.
Fixing n > 3, for all i and j (1 < i < j < n) define
∆
(n)
i,j = Γ
(n) \ {δi, δj}
∆
∗(n)
i,j = Γ
∗(n) \ {δi, δj}.
Again (n)-superscripts are omitted where possible for clarity.
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Lemma 6.10. Let θ be an R†-formula and θ∗ an R∗†-formula. For all i, j
(1 < i < j < n), if ∆i,j |= θ, then θ ∈ ∆i,j. Likewise, if ∆∗i,j |= θ
∗, then
θ∗ ∈ ∆∗i,j.
Proof. We prove the first statement only; the proof of the second is similar.
Given the equations Γ(n) =
(
Th
(
A(n)
)
\ {γ}
)
∪ {γ¯} and ∆
(n)
i,j = Γ
(n) \ {δi, δj},
Lemma 6.6 yields
Bi |= ∆i,j ∪ {δ¯i, δj} (41)
Bj |= ∆i,j ∪ {δi, δ¯j}. (42)
Certainly, then, ∆i,j is satisfiable; hence, the only θ we need consider are those
such that neither θ nor θ¯ is in ∆i,j . By the completeness of Γ
(n), this entails
θ ∈ {δi, δ¯j , δ¯i, δj}. In the first two cases, (41) shows that ∆i,j 6|= θ; in the third
and fourth cases, (42) shows the same.
Lemma 6.11. If X is a finite set of syllogistic rules in R†, then there exists
n such that, for any absurdity ⊥ in R†, Γ(n) 6⊢X ⊥. If X is a finite set of
syllogistic rules in R∗†, then there exists n such that, for any absurdity ⊥ in
R∗†, Γ(n) 6⊢X ⊥.
Proof. We prove the lemma for R†; the proof for R∗† is similar. Since the
number of rules in X is finite, let k be the largest number of antecedents in
any of these rules, and fix n = k + 2. Since no instance of a rule of X has
more than n− 2 antecedents, any such set of antecedents included in Γ(n) must
also be included in ∆
(n)
i,j for some 1 < i < j < n. Let θ be the consequent of
this rule-instance. Since ⊢X is sound, ∆
(n)
i,j |= θ, whence θ ∈ ∆
(n)
i,j ⊆ Γ
(n), by
Lemma 6.10. A simple induction on the lengths of proofs then shows that any
formula derived from Γ(n) is in Γ(n). But Γ(n) contains no absurdity.
We now have the promised strengthening of Corollary 6.4. In some sense,
Lemma 6.11 has done all the work; for (RAA) is, in the context of aR†-complete
(or R∗†-complete) set of premises, essentially redundant.
Theorem 6.12. There exists no finite set X of syllogistic rules in either R† or
R∗† such that X is both sound and complete.
Proof. We prove the lemma for R†; the proof for R∗† is almost identical. Sup-
pose X is a finite set of syllogistic rules in R†, with X sound. Let n and Γ(n)
be as in Lemma 6.11, and let ⊥ be any absurdity in R†. Thus, by Lemma 6.5,
Γ(n) |= ⊥, but, by Lemma 6.11, Γ(n) 6⊢X ⊥. It suffices to show that Γ(n) 6X ⊥.
Suppose then, for contradiction, that there is an indirect derivation of an
absurdity from Γ(n), using the rules X. Consider such a derivation in which
the number k of applications of (RAA) is minimal. Since Γ(n) 6⊢X ⊥, we know
that k > 0. Consider the last application of (RAA) in this derivation, which
derives an R†-formula, say, θ¯, discharging a premise θ. That is, there is an
(indirect) derivation of some absurdity ⊥′ from Γ(n) ∪ {θ}, employing fewer
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than k applications of (RAA). By minimality of k, θ 6∈ Γ(n), and so, by the R†-
completeness of Γ(n), θ¯ ∈ Γ(n). But then we can replace our original derivation
of of θ¯ with a trivial derivation, so obtaining a derivation of ⊥ from Γ(n) with
fewer than k applications of (RAA), a contradiction.
The upshot: unlike in the case of R∗, the full power of reductio does not
help with R† and R∗†.
7 Relation to other work
Systems related to S and S† Modern treatments of the the syllogistic can
all be traced back to  Lukasiewicz [8], where a logic is presented in which formu-
las of the forms (2) are treated as atoms in a propositional calculus.  Lukasiewicz
provides a collection of axiom-schemata which, together with the usual axioms of
propositional logic, yields a complete proof-system for the resulting language (a
strict superset of S). The completeness of this system was shown independently
by Westerst˚ahl [20]; note that it differs from the syllogistic fragments consid-
ered in this paper, in that it is embedded within propositional logic. Other
commentators, for example, Smiley [18], Corcoran [2] and Martin [9], objecting
to  Lukasiewicz’ exegesis of Aristotle, provide proof-systems in the form of syllo-
gistic rules similar to those of S, again proving completeness of their respective
systems. These systems are not direct syllogistic systems, since they all employ
reductio ad absurdum. Our emphasis on direct syllogistic systems, and espe-
cially the formulation of refutation-completeness is new, and motivated by the
results we have obtained on relational extensions of the syllogistic. In addition,
the authors mentioned above do not treat the fragment S†. The completeness
of S itself appears as Theorem 6.2 in Moss [14], where various fragments of S
are also axiomatized. The completeness of S† is proved in Moss [12], using a
somewhat different treatment.
Systems related to R The first presentation of a complete proof-system for
a fragment close to the relational syllogistic seems to be Nishihara, Morita, and
Iwata [15]. This logic is in effect a relational version of  Lukasiewicz’, in that
formulas roughly similar to those of the forms (6) are treated as atoms of a
propositional calculus. The authors provide axiom-schemata which, together
with the usual axioms of propositional logic, yield a complete proof-system for
the language in question. Actually, the propositional atoms in this language are
allowed to feature n-ary predicates for all n > 1. However, the rather strange
restrictions on quantifier-scope (existentials must always outscope universals),
mean that this language is primarily of interest for atoms featuring only unary
and binary predicates; these atoms (and their negations) then essentially corre-
spond the formulas of our fragment R. We mention in passing that Nishihara
et al.’s language includes individual constants; but in practice, this leads to
no useful increase in expressive power, and we ignore this feature. Because it
involves such an expressive fragment, which includes full propositional logic,
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their proof certainly yields no upper complexity bound comparable to that of
Theorem 4.11.
A logic inspired by the system of Nishihara et al may be found in Moss [13].
Roughly speaking, that logic is the negation-free fragment of R, corresponding
to sentence-forms involving the words some and all, but not no. However, it
extends R in that it allows both readings of scope-ambiguous sentences. For
example, a sentence like Every painter admires some artist has both a subject wide
scope reading and a subject narrow scope reading. The fact that the subject
wide scope reading of logically implies the subject narrow reading is then a rule
of inference in Moss’ system. No contradictions are possible in the system.
Moss [13] also analyses a syllogistic logic with negated nouns (not verbs) and
only using All. So in our notation, its formulas are ∀(l,m) and ∀(l, ∀(m, r)), with
l and m unary literals. In addition to rules we have seen, it uses the following
additional rules which might be taken to be forms of the law of the excluded
middle:
∀(n, ∀(q, r)) ∀(n¯, ∀(q, r))
∀(p, ∀(q, r))
∀(p, ∀(n, r)) ∀(p, ∀(n¯, r))
∀(p, ∀(q, r)).
The system is completed by a rule with three premises:
∀(p, ∀(n, r)) ∀(o, ∀(q, r)) ∀(o¯, ∀(n¯, r))
∀(p, ∀(q, r)).
McAllester and Givan’s fragment We have already had occasion to men-
tion the results of McAllester and Givan [10] in connection with our fragment
R∗. McAllester and Givan present a “Montagovian syntax” for a first-order lan-
guage over a signature of unary and binary predicates and individual constants,
together with (what they call) its “quantifier-free” fragment. In fact, this latter
fragment is like our fragment R∗, except that its ‘class-terms’ (the equivalent of
our c-terms) can be nested to arbitrary depth. Thus, in McAllester and Givan’s
language, the formula
∀(∃(∃(man, kill), kill), ∃(∃(animal, kill), kill))
expresses the proposition that, as de Morgan might have put it, he who kills one
who kills a man kills one who kills an animal. However, the ability to embed
c-terms to arbitrary depth is easily seen not to confer any essential increase
in expressive power of sets of formulas, since deeply nested class-terms can
always be ‘defined out’ by introducing new unary predicates. (This is reflected
in the fact that the satisfiability problem for R∗ is no different from that of
McAllester and Givan’s fragment.) Interestingly, McAllester and Givan show
that the satisfiability of a set Γ of R∗-formulas can be determined in polynomial
time if, for each class-term c occurring in Γ, Γ contains either the formula ∃(c, c)
or the formula ∀(c, c¯). (Such formula sets are said to determine existentials).
McAllester and Givan provide a syllogistic-like system for this fragment, which
is complete for sets of formulas which determine existentials.
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A sub-fragment of the McAllester and Givan fragment was considered in
Moss [13]. In our terms, the formulas would be of the forms ∀(c, d) and ∃(c, d),
where c and d are class-terms of the forms p (an atom), ∃(c, r), or ∀(d, r).
Thus the system lacks negation. The rules are versions of rules we have seen
in Section 5: (T), (I), (B), (D), (J), (K), (L), and (II); it also employs a rule
allowing for reasoning-by-cases, which is not a syllogistic rule in the sense of this
paper. An informal example shows that the system allows non-trivial inferences,
and inferences with more than one verb.
All porcupines are mammals
All who respect all mammals respect all porcupines
All who dislike all who respect all porcupines dislike all who respect all mammals.
Modern revivals of term logic In recent decades, various logicians have
challenged the dominant paradigm of quantification-theory by seeking to reha-
bilitate term logic—essentially, the extension of the traditional presentation of
the syllogistic to the case of polyadic relations (see, e.g. Sommers [19], Engle-
bretsen [5]). Broadly, the strategy adopted by these term-logicians has been to
stress the expressiveness of the new term-logical syntax, and its ability to repre-
sent all that is represented in quantificational logic. (For a very clear account,
see, Michael Lockwood’s Appendix G to Sommers [19], pp. 426–456.) By adopt-
ing the new, term-logical framework—so goes the argument—we obtain a formal
system with all the expressive power of first-order logic, but with the added (al-
leged) advantage of greater fidelity to the structure of natural language. The
outlook of the present paper is rather different, however. True, the fragments
considered here could be simply and elegantly expressed using the syntax of
term-logic. The resulting formulas would exhibit only cosmetic differences to
the syntax introduced in Section 2; and, of course, the associated proof-systems
would be, modulo these cosmetic differences, unaffected. However, we have
been at pains to stress the inexpressiveness of the fragments studied above,
because with inexpressiveness comes low computational complexity. And from
the point of view of computational complexity, the issue of the ruling syntactic
re´gime—predicate logic or term logic—is immaterial.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated the availability of syllogism-like proof-systems
for various extensions of the traditional syllogistic, with special emphasis on the
need for the rule of reductio ad absurdum; in addition, we have derived tight
complexity bounds for all the logics investigated.
These logics are: (i) S, which corresponds to the traditional syllogistic; (ii)
S†, which extends S with negated nouns; (iii)R, which extends S with transitive
verbs; (iv) R†, which extends S with both these constructions; (v) R∗, which
extends R by allowing subject noun phrases to contain relative clauses; and (vi)
R∗†, which extends R∗ with negated nouns. The inclusion relations between
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SR
R∗
S†
R†
R∗†
FO2
⊆
⊆
⊆
⊇
⊇ ⊇
⊇
⊆ S direct, complete NLogSpace
S
† direct, complete NLogSpace
R direct, refutation complete NLogSpace
R
† not even indirect ExpTime
R
∗ indirect, complete Co-NPTime [10]
R
∗† not even indirect ExpTime
FO2 NExpTime [6]
Figure 5: The six fragments studied in this paper together with the two-variable
fragment FO2 of first-order logic. The table shows strongest possible results on
the existence of syllogistic systems, together with tight complexity bounds. See
Section 8 for an explanation.
these systems, together with the familiar two-variable fragment of first-order
logic, are shown in Figure 5.
The associated table lists these fragments together with the results we ob-
tained on the existence of syllogistic systems and the complexity of determining
validity of sequents. Regarding the existence of syllogistic systems, we showed
that: (i) S and S† both have sound and complete direct syllogistic systems
(i.e. systems containing no rule of reductio ad absurdum); (ii) R has a sound
and refutation-complete direct syllogistic system (i.e. one which becomes com-
plete if reductio ad absurdum is allowed as a single, final step), but no sound and
complete direct syllogistic system; (iii) R∗ has a sound and complete indirect
syllogistic system (i.e. one allowing unrestricted use of reductio ad absurdum),
but—unless PTime=NPTime—no sound and refutation-complete direct syllo-
gistic system; (iv) neitherR† norR∗† has even an indirect syllogistic system that
is sound and complete. Regarding complexity, we showed that: (i) the problem
of determining the validity of a sequent in any of S, S† or R is NLogSpace-
complete; (ii) the problem of determining the validity of a sequent in R∗ is
co-NPTime-complete; (iii) the problem of determining the validity of a sequent
in either of R† or R∗† is ExpTime-complete.
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